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INTRODUCTION
The one aspect of church and state relations about which there is currently little
dispute is that contacts between the two are increasing.' Activities of religious
organizations, previously untouched, are now becoming subject to government
regulation. 2 At the same time, the activities of religious organizations are expanding. 3
Religion in politics, 4 business,5 and other secular callings 6 is increasingly visible and
prominent.
As the contacts between church and state have increased, so has litigation-
often involving constitutional issues-raising serious questions about the proper
relationship between government and religious organizations. 7 In the wake of this
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1. Increased contacts between church and state may be attributable to two major social changes that have occurred
since the Constitution was written-increased religious diversity and increased involvement of organized church groups
with business and society. See Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious
Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347, 365-69 (1984).
2. Changes in such diverse legislation as the Internal Revenue Code (through the Tax Reform Act of 1969), the
1972 amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act have acted to
subject formerly exempted church activities to government regulation. Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion
Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1195, 1231 (1980).
[D]uring the last ten years, American Church leaders have become increasingly concerned about governmental
definitions and regulations of churches and religious activities. A small but growing number of religious leaders
of all faiths fear that the golden age of religious exemptions has ended. They believe that we are already in the
twilight of substantially increased governmental regulation.
Id. at 1231 (quoting Whelan, Government and the Church, 139 AmucA, Dec. 16, 1978, at 450). For a detailed study of
the regulations' impact on religiously affiliated higher education, see E. GAi-,Eae & P. Moors, GovERsmEr AND C~wvs:
FEsmnw REsouLA.oN oF REsiousLV AffuxAr ILoans FnucAmOs (1982).
3. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 367-68.
4. For a detailed examination of the involvement of the Catholic clergy in the American political system, see
BerEN Goo AND CA a (M. Kolbenschlag ed. 1985).
5. See A. Bmax, TE REumo.4 Buseas 7-12 (1968).
6. See J. HAaous & C. SwNmN, Pume True PgeAcamrs 1-18 (1981); P. Hosrsw, Raamus TELEvisioN 8-10 (1984).
7. The following areas of government intervention were enumerated by William P. Thompson, Chairperson of the
1982 Conference on the Religion Clauses sponsored by the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.: (1)
Efforts to regulate fundraising solicitations by religious bodies; (2) Efforts to require religious groups to register with and
report to government officials if they engage in any efforts to influence legislation (so-called "lobbying disclosure" laws);
(3) Efforts by the NLRB to supervise elections by lay teachers in Roman Catholic parochial schools for labor
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litigation, an intriguing and potentially far-reaching constitutional theory has devel-
oped. This theory suggests that government regulations affecting the activities of
religious organizations violate the constitutional provisions most often associated
with the prohibition of government aid to those organizations-the establishment
clause.8
The Supreme Court has yet to utilize the establishment clause to strike down
legislative enactments that regulate the activities of religious institutions. 9 Neverthe-
less, a strong possibility exists that the Court may apply the clause in this manner.
Both the Court's dicta10 and its formulation of the establishment inquiry,' suggest that
the establishment clause may indeed be interpreted as insulating institutional religion
from state regulatory efforts. Because the Court has thus far not definitively ruled on
this issue, it remains something of a constitutional loose end. Not surprisingly, the
lack of resolution has caused a great deal of confusion among the lower courts about
the application of the establishment clause to regulatory issues. 12
representation (which have since been halted by the U.S. Supreme Court); (4) Efforts by the Internal Revenue Service to
separate church-related colleges and hospitals from the churches that sponsor them, for tax purposes, through the
definition of "integrated auxiliaries"; (5) Attempts by state education departments to regulate curriculum content and
teachers' qualifications in Christian schools (since halted by state courts in Ohio, Vermont, and Kentucky); (6) Attempts
by federal and state departments of labor to collect unemployment compensation taxes from church-related agencies that
hitherto were exempt, as churches are; (7) Requirements imposed by the former Department of Health, Education and
Welfare for coeducational sports, hygiene instruction, and dormitory and off-campus residence facilities at church-related
colleges (such as Brigham Young University) which had religious objections to mingling of the sexes in such ways; (8)
Efforts by several federal agencies (Civil Rights Commission, Equal Employment Opportunities Commission,
Department of Health and Human Services, and Department of Education) to require church-related agencies and
institutions, including theological seminaries, to report their employment and admissions statistics by race, sex, and
religion, even though they received no government funds, with threats to cut off funds to students attending such schools
unless they hired faculty from other religious faiths or complied with other requirements; (9) Sampling surveys ofchurches
and church agencies, conducted by the Bureau of the Census, requiring them to submit voluminous reports, even though
the Bureau admitted that it had no authority to do so; (10) Grand jury interrogations of church workers about internal
affairs of churches; (11) Clergy used as informants by intelligence agencies; (12) Subpoenas of ecclesiastical records by
plaintiffs and defendants in civil and criminal suits; (13) Placing a church in receivership based on dissident members'
allegations of financial mismanagement; (14) Orders granted by courts of conservatorship to parents to obtain physical
custody of adult children from unpopular religious movements for purposes of forcing them to abandon their adherence
thereto; (15) Withdrawal of tax exemption from various religious groups for failure to comply with public policy; (16) IRS
definition of "religious ministry" which establishes qualifications to exclude cash housing allowance from taxable income
(often contradicting the religious body's own definition of "ministry"); and (17) Redefinition by the courts of
ecclesiastical polity, so that hierarchical bodies are in effect determined to be congregational in polity, and dispersed
"connectional" bodies are deemed to be hierarchical. Thompson, Opening Statement of the Chairperson, in Govsamerr
INTRvmmnoN iN Rturtous ASFA=s 17-18 (D. Kelley ed. 1982).
8. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I, cl. 1. See Esbeck, supra note 1, at 247-48; see also Note, Government Non-Involvement
with Religious Institutions, 59 TEx. L. REv. 921 (1981).
9. In Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), however, the Court did invalidate a charitable solicitation law that
preferred one religion over another. Id. at 253-54.
10. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501-04 (1979).
11. The classic foundation of the establishment inquiry test was set down in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971). See infra text accompanying note 27.
12. If recitation by lower courts proves the value of a legal rule, then the entanglement test, as enunciated
in Lemon, is priceless. The test has become almost like holy writ: ceremoniously invoked and fervently quoted,
but seldom criticized. Nearly every court which has considered cases even remotely related to potential
entanglement has quoted the Lemon test verbatim. While the lower courts have had little difficulty in quoting
the Lemon test consistently, they have had increasingly more difficulty in explaining and applying it consistently
to particular fact situations. Even more fundamental, the lower court opinions evidence an uncertainty as to
when to use the entanglement test.
Serritela, Tangling with Entanglement: Toward a Constitutional Evaluation of Church-State Contacts, 44 LAw &
Cormo'z. lhoBs. 143, 146-47 (Spring 1981) (emphasis in original).
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE LIMITS ON RELIGION
Undoubtedly, the intuitive response of many people to the proposition that the
establishment clause protects religious organizations from government regulation
would be one of surprise. The free exercise clause traditionally has been the
constitutional provision under which alleged government infringement upon religious
liberty has been examined. 13 Thus, it might be argued that the establishment theory
is no more than a new name for an old theory.' 4
However, review of what may be termed the "regulatory establishment" claim
indicates that it is far more than a simple claim for free exercise protection. At a
pragmatic level, the establishment claim seeks a substantial departure from the results
that would occur under free exercise analysis. At its essence, it advocates that a
greater range of activities of religious institutions be protected than occurs under free
exercise principles, 15 and that the protection accorded those activities be more
comprehensive. 16
On a theoretical level, this regulatory establishment argument also presents a
change, at least in emphasis, and possibly in orientation, of the central meaning of
establishment. The dominant understanding of establishment has been political and
individualistic. According to this theory, the establishment guarantee is designed to
protect individual liberty by assuring government freedom from religious influence.1 7
The theory that the establishment clause protects religious institutions from regulatory
programs, on the other hand, is theological and institutional. Its theological concern
is protecting religion from the corrupting influence of government.' 8 Its focus for this
purpose is institutional-protecting so-called "corporate" religion rather than
individual exercise. 19
In this Article, we address the contention that the establishment clause should be
appropriately viewed as a means to protect religious institutions from state regulatory
efforts. Part I traces the development and application of the regulatory establishment
claim in the case law. Part I examines the theoretical propositions that support the
use of the establishment clause by religious institutions as a protection against
governmental interference. Part I presents the pragmatic and theoretical arguments
opposed to this position. Finally, Part IV presents the conclusion that, except in
limited circumstances, the establishment clause is not an appropriate vehicle to
measure the constitutionality of governmental efforts to regulate the activity of
religious institutions, and the legality of those measures should be judged solely by
reference to other constitutional provisions, most notably the free speech and free
exercise clauses.
13. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
14. But see State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, 683 S.W.2d 692, 694-95 (Tex. 1985) (stating that
the licensing requirement at issue did not offend the establishment clause, but that "a more appropriate and direct means"
of questioning the constitutionality of the regulation would be through the free exercise clause).
15. See infra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
19. Corporate, as opposed to individual, religion means "group belief, worship, and morality" and the imposition
of a religious discipline upon members of the group. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 Sup.
Cr. REv. 83, 90 (1983).
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I. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AS PROTECION FOR RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS FROM
GovERNMENTAL INTERFERENc--THE CURRENT DocRuINAL CHAos
A. Precedential Underpinnings-The Decisions of the Supreme Court
The first suggestion that the Supreme Court might invoke the establishment
clause to protect religious institutions from governmental interference arose in the
case in which the Court set the framework for its modem establishment understand-
ing. In Everson v. Board of Education,20 the Court considered the constitutionality of
a New Jersey statute that provided bus transportation to students attending parochial
schools. Despite the Court's invoking the classic Jeffersonian metaphor of "a wall of
separation between church and state" 2' and buttressing its remarks with the
proposition that no tax, great or small, should be levied by the state in support of
religion, 22 the Court nonetheless upheld the program.2 3 The Court's rationale for
upholding the program is significant. -The Court realized that denial of bus
transportation benefits to religious schools, when those benefits were freely available
to the general public, would itself raise constitutional concems. 24 According to the
Court, the establishment clause requires that government neither advance nor inhibit
religion.25
The language in Everson which suggests that the establishment clause prohibits
the inhibition of religion has been continually repeated since the Everson decision.
Currently, it is enshrined in the second prong of the famous three-part test of Lemon
v. Kurtzman, which is applied throughout the Court's establishment jurisprudence.2 6
This test requires that the statute have a secular purpose, that its principal or primary
effect be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and that the statute not foster
"an excessive government entanglement with religion." 27
Obviously, the "inhibits" language, if literally interpreted, could serve to
protect religious institutions from state regulation. However, since the Court has yet
to strike down an enactment pursuant to the "inhibits" language, the meaning of that
language remains unclear. For this reason, the fact that the Court's first admonition
against inhibiting religion occurred in the context of its upholding an aid statute may
be significant. There is, after all, a great difference between using a principle as a
rationale to uphold an aid statute and using it to invalidate a government regulation.
It is arguable that the "inhibits" language may apply only when religion or religious
adherents are deprived of benefits available to all other segments of the community.
Equally perplexing is the application of the third prong of the Lemon test-
entanglement-to government regulation. As with the prohibition against inhibiting
religion, the prohibition against entangling church and state could easily be applied
20. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
21. Id. at 16.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 18.
24. Id. at 16-17.
25. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
26. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
27. Id. at 612-13.
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to regulatory requirements. Yet, as with the "inhibits" language, the genesis of the
nonentanglement requirement in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York was as a
rationale for upholding an aid provision.28 Walz concerned the constitutionality of
property tax exemptions for religious institutions. 29 In upholding the tax exemptions,
the Court relied heavily on the proposition that one purpose and effect of tax
exemption was to ensure that there would not be "an excessive government
entanglement with religion," 30 as might occur through the use of tax liens or
foreclosures to enforce a church's tax obligations. 31 One year later, the Court in
Lemon entrenched the prohibition against excessive government entanglement with
religion in the third prong of the Court's establishment test, and used it to invalidate
a parochial aid program.32
As with "inhibits," the meaning of the term "excessive entanglement" has not
been clarified. One commentator, for example, has argued that the principle does no
more than license subjectivity on the part of those who apply the standards. 33 Yet one
matter is clear: the entanglement test has never been used to strike down a regulatory
requirement. On two occasions, however, the Supreme Court has suggested that it
might apply the entanglement test to protect religious organizations from government
regulation. 34 These cases merit attention here.
In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,35 the Court confronted the NLRB's
asserted jurisdiction over two sets of high schools operated by the Catholic church.
In both instances, lay faculty of the high schools had voted for representation by an
employee association and had sought to bargain with their respective employers.3 6
The Seventh Circuit had refused to enforce the NLRB's bargaining order on the
ground that it would violate the religion clauses of the first amendment. 37
The Supreme Court affirmed in a curious opinion that discussed but did not
decide the constitutional issues. 3  The Court analyzed whether first amendment issues
would be implicated by the assertion of NLRB jurisdiction. Having concluded that
they would, the Court determined that constitutional implications required a finding
of a clearly expressed Congressional intention that the NLRB possess that jurisdic-
tion. 39 Finding no such express intention, the Court concluded that the NLRB could
not exercise jurisdiction over the teachers. 40
The Court identified three specific constitutional issues4 ' and briefly discussed
28. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
29. Id. at 666.
30. Id. at 674.
31. Id.
32. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
33. Ripple, supra note 2, at 1216-18.
34. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501-07 (1979) (entire analysis centers on the
entanglement issue); Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 105 S. Ct. 1953, 1964 (1985) (perfunctory
treatment of the inhibition issue).
35. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
36. Id. at 493.
37. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1131 (7th Cir. 1977).
38. 440 U.S. 490, 506-07 (1979).
39. Id. at 504.
40. Id. at 506.
41. See id. at 499-507.
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problems that would be posed by each one were it before the Court.42 Because this
case has been relied upon by lower courts in resolving similar church regulation
cases, a review of the Court's dicta is required.
First, the Court indicated that because of the "unique role of the teacher in
fulfilling the mission of a church-operated school," 43 improper entanglement
between church and state was more likely than in other areas. The Court stopped
short, however, of deciding that mandatory collective bargaining involving faculty at
religious schools would create this excessive entanglement, stating only that some
entanglement could not be avoided by the assumption of NLRB jurisdiction. 44 "[We
are not compelled to determine whether the entanglement is excessive as we would
were we considering the constitutional issue."' 45
The Court also considered, but did not decide, a second closely related issue-
whether an NLRB investigation of an unfair labor practice charge would entangle the
Board in the religious polity's theological determinations when the religious
organization asserted that the contested practice was motivated by religious princi-
ple.46 Regarding this issue, the Court merely repeated the Seventh Circuit's
observation that inquiry into religious principle would be necessary. 47 Such an
inquiry into religious beliefs would, according to the Court, present "a significant
risk that the First Amendment would be infringed. "48
Third, the Court considered, but again did not determine, whether NLRB
determinations of the proper subjects for bargaining would result in unconstitutional
conflicts between the Board and clergy-administrators. 49 The Court did not offer
specific examples of conflicts that might arise, nor did it suggest why any conflict
would be impermissible. The Court merely noted that since topics for collective
bargaining arguably included everything that occurred in the parochial schools, such
a determination would "[ilnevitably ... implicate sensitive issues that open the
door" to conflicts between the clergy and the Board or the union. 50
In sum, if the Court intended to say that establishment clause theory would be
applied in future church regulation cases, it failed expressly to do so. On the other
hand, it is clear that the Court meant to convey that governmental intrusion upon a
religious organization raises constitutional concerns involving both the establishment
42. Id.
43. Id. at 501 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); and
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) as authority for the proposition).
44. 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. The factual premise of this statement is questionable. The Court apparently accepted the bishops' argument
that whenever a faculty employee is discharged under circumstances suggesting antiunion motivation, the NLRB not only
questions whether the religious principle offered as justification is merely pretextual, but also seeks to show pretext by
inquiring whether the principle is part of the school's religion at all. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112,
1125 (7th Cir. 1977). Logically, however, the NLRB need not show that a religious principle is a sham to establish that
the principle did not motivate the discharge. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983)
(holding that action complained of was not motivated by the reasoning offered because others had engaged in similar
misconduct without discipline).
49. 440 U.S. 490, 504 (1979).
50. Id. at 503.
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE LIMITS ON RELIGION
and free exercise clauses.5' At least, the Catholic Bishop opinion suggested that a
legislative decision to exempt religious institutions would be well founded. However,
because the Court did not reach the constitutional issues, the question is open as to
whether the actual regulatory practice in Catholic Bishop implicates establishment,
free exercise, or any constitutional interest at all.
The Court next examined whether the establishment clause shields religious
organizations from government regulations in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v.
Secretary of Labor.52 The Foundation, a nonprofit religious organization, had as its
primary purpose the establishment and maintenance of an evangelistic church. 53 The
Foundation also operated at least thirty commercial businesses-including service
stations, restaurants, retail clothing and grocery outlets, roofing and electrical
construction companies, and hog farms. 54 These businesses were staffed in part by
three hundred of the Foundation's associates (described by the courts as rehabilitated
derelicts, drug addicts, and criminals), who considered themselves to be volunteers,
and who neither expected nor desired monetary compensation for their work. 55 The
associates received food, clothing, shelter, transportation, and medical benefits from
the Foundation, and tended to be entirely dependent upon these benefits for long
periods of time. 56
The Secretary of Labor filed suit against the Foundation in 1977, seeking
injunctive relief for violations of the minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).57 The Foundation sought
dismissal, relying on both statutory and constitutional defenses. As a statutory matter,
the Foundation argued that it was outside the statutory boundaries because it was not
an "enterprise" under the Act, nor were its associates "employees." 58 On a
constitutional level, the Foundation argued that if it were subject to the provisions of
the Act, its free exercise rights and the establishment proscription against excessive
entanglement would be violated. 59
The district court held for the government on all issues.6o Since the Foundation
was engaged in various commercial activities that served the general public and
competed with other entrepreneurs, the court defined it as an enterprise under the
Act. 61 The court further held that the benefits received by the associates were
"simply wages in another form," and thus, the associates were employees within the
51. The Supreme Court adopted the Seventh Circuit's characterization of the constitutional issues as invoking the
combined Religion Clauses rather than differentiating between the dual aspects of establishment and free exercise of
religion. See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1131 (7th Cir. 1977).
52. 105 S. Ct. 1953 (1985), aff'g Donovan v. Tony and Susan Alamo Found., 722 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1983), aff'g
in parr 567 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
53. Id. at 1957.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1957-58.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1957. See Donovan v. Tony and Susan Alamo Found., 567 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
58. 567 F. Supp. 556, 573-75 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
59. Id. at 574.
60. Id. at 573-75.
61. Id. at 573.
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meaning of the Act.62 Finally, reaching the constitutional issues, the court held that
applying the FLSA to the Foundation's associates did not violate the religious
guarantees of the first amendment. 63
On appeal, the issue of whether the application of the FLSA to the Foundation's
associates violated the establishment clause was considered in some detail by the
Eighth Circuit. Applying the three-part Lemon test, that court found that the FLSA
had a clear secular purpose, namely the protection of the health and economic welfare
of workers. 64 The court also found no difficulty with the primary effect of the
legislation prong of the Lemon test, since the legislation neither advanced nor
inhibited religious concerns. 65
However, the issue of excessive entanglement between church and state, and the
Catholic Bishop precedent posed a substantial problem for the appellate court. 66 The
court distinguished Catholic Bishop on two grounds. First, the court stated that the
entanglement problems raised by the enforcement of minimum wage and hour
provisions against church-operated charities or commercial businesses were substan-
tially less than those raised by the continuous and ongoing supervision of teachers in
a church school, since the former involves neither "the critical and unique role of the
teacher," nor "the danger of government involvement in day-to-day administration
and monitoring." 67 Second, the court observed that the mechanisms utilized by the
National Labor Relations Act, namely collective bargaining and elections, were
inherently confrontational and adversarial in nature, whereas the FLSA "effects its
objectives by the dull and detailed financial technique peculiar to accountants.' 68 On
this basis, the Eighth Circuit concluded that no violation of the establishment clause
had been presented. 69
The Supreme Court dismissed the establishment clause challenge briefly,
implying that a regulatory enactment could pose establishment clause concerns
nevertheless. The Court stated that the FLSA had a legitimate secular purpose and
that the "routine and factual inquiries" required by the Act "bear no resemblance to
the kind of government surveillance ... previously held to pose an intolerable risk
of government entanglement with religion" and were no more intrusive than fire
inspections or building and zoning regulations, none of which exempt religious
organizations. 70 Thus, as with Catholic Bishop, the possibility that the establishment
clause could be used to strike down governmental regulation of corporate religious
activity remained.
The preceeding account of the regulatory establishment issue would not be
complete without at least a brief mention of Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton
62. Id. at 574.
63. Id.
64. Donovan v. Tony and Susan Alamo Found., 722 F.2d 397, 401-02 (8th Cir. 1983).
65. Id. at 402.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 402-03.
69. Id. at 403.
70. Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 105 S. Ct. 1953, 1964 (1985).
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Christian Schools,71 a case most notable for its avoidance of the substantive issue.
The matters leading up to the Dayton Christian Schools decision began when a
religious employer, the Dayton Christian Schools (DCS), informed one of its teachers
that her contract would not be renewed for the upcoming year because she was
pregnant and DCS policy was that mothers should stay at home with pre-school age
children. When the teacher consulted an attorney regarding this matter, rather than
proceeding internally, she was terminated by DCS on the grounds that her seeking
outside counsel violated the "biblical chain of command," a doctrine ascribed to by
DCS which posits that "one Christian should not take another Christian into the
courts of the State." 72
Following her termination, the teacher filed a charge of sex discrimination with
the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (Commission). The Commission instituted a
preliminary investigation which resulted in a finding of probable cause to believe that
DCS had engaged in unlawful discrimination and had illegally retaliated against the
teacher. 73 The Commission also indicated that its jurisdiction was not ousted on the
grounds that DCS was a religious institution. 74 After unsuccessfully urging concili-
ation, the Commission filed a formal complaint against DCS. DCS answered by
asserting that the Commission lacked jurisdiction because of the religious basis for
the discharge.75
While these proceedings were pending, DCS sued in federal court seeking a
permanent injunction against the Commission on the grounds that "any investigation
of [DCS] hiring process or any imposition of sanctions ... would violate the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. '"76 The district court dismissed the
complaint,77 but the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Commission's exercise
of jurisdiction was contrary to both the free exercise and establishment clauses. 78 The
establishment holding of the Sixth Circuit was an express approval of the regulatory
establishment position. Using an entanglement analysis, the court held that the
exercise of jurisdiction over DCS raised three difficulties. First, it involved regulation
over an institution that was pervasively religious. 79 Second, it would immerse the
state in inquiries regarding the religious bases of personnel decisions affecting
teachers, termed by the Circuit Court as the "ideological resources of the school.' 80
Third, it would create an ongoing, rather than a one-time, church-state encounter.8 1
On this basis the circuit court concluded that the Commission's proceeding against
DCS violated the establishment clause.
71. 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986).
72. Id. at 2721.
73. Id. at 2721.
74. Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932, 935 (6th Cir. 1985).
75. Id.
76. 106 S. Ct. 2718, 2722 (1986).
77. Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 578 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
78. Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985).
79. Id. at 957.
80. Id. at 958.
81. Id. at 958-959.
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The United States Supreme Court reversed, primarily on procedural grounds.8 2
Relying on the principles announced in Younger v. Harris,8 3 the Court held that the
federal court should defer to the ongoing state proceedings, since those proceedings
vindicated "important state interests" 4 and since the school would have a "full and
fair opportunity to litigate [its] constitutional claim. "85 The Court briefly touched upon
the religion clause issues by rejecting the school's argument that "the mere exercise
of jurisdiction over it by the state violates its first amendment rights.'"86 But even here
the Court's first response was procedural: "[W]e have repeatedly rejected the argu-
ment that a constitutional attack on state procedures themselves 'automatically vitiates
the adequacy of those procedures for purposes of the Younger-Huffinan line of
cases.'"87 The Court went on to address the regulatory establishment claim in an
extraordinarily brusque fashion. Dismissing DCS' argument, the Court wrote, "Even
religious schools cannot claim to be wholly free from soiie state regulation .... [T]he
Commission violates no constitutional rights by merely investigating the circum-
stances of [the teacher's] discharge in this case .... "88 To the extent these statements
are not mere dicta, they suggest a strong repudiation of both the DCS' and the Sixth
Circuit's regulatory establishment analysis. The only certainty, however, is that
because of its oblique reference to the issue, Dayton Christian Schools will likely add
to the confusion surrounding the regulatory establishment claim.
B. Doctrinal Confusion in the Lower Courts
Regulatory establishment challenges to government regulations have been con-
sidered in a variety of contexts by the lower courts. These include challenges by
parochial schools to compulsory education,8 9 teacher certification and curriculum
requirements;90 attacks on compulsory process issued by the IRS and other government
agencies; 9' and objections to various local ordinances relating to zoning, 92 solicita-
tion, 93 and licensing94 as applied to religious organizations. Labor law particularly has
generated much litigation, with employment discrimination regulation occupying
much of the battleground. 95 However, both Alamo and Catholic Bishop demonstrate
that the regulatory establishment issue exists in other labor law contexts and, in that
respect, it is notable that neither case conclusively settled the constitutionality of their
82. All nine Justices avoided direct review of the substantive issues. The five-person majority required dismissal
on the equitable restraint principles announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Four concurring Justices argued
that the case should be dismissed on ripeness grounds.
83. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
84. 106 S. Ct. 2718, 2722 (1986). The Court extended the Younger doctrine from state criminal proceedings to
state civil proceedings vindicating important state interests in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
85. Id. at 2723.
86. Id. at 2724.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
92. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
93. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
94. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
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respective statutes' application to religious organizations. The constitutionality of the
FLSA as applied to church-controlled schools remains in doubt even after Alamo,
96
and a number of courts, distinguishing Catholic Bishop, have approved the exercise
of NLRB jurisdiction over a variety of religious institutions. 97
Review of the lower court decisions reflects serious doctrinal confusion, as well
as outright disagreement, over fundamental principles. Indeed, the courts fail to agree
on how to frame the regulatory establishment principle. Some religious organizations
have phrased their objections to reporting requirements in terms of entanglement;
98
others have claimed religious harassment 99 or relied on general first amendment
grounds. 100 Compulsory process has been characterized as an entanglement viola-
tion,10' or, occasionally, as a violation of associational rights. 102 Certification1
03 and
licensing' 04 requirements also have been challenged on these grounds and on the basis
that the state lacks the authority to promulgate such regulations. 105
The results in the cases, as one might expect, are equally inconsistent. In the area
of employment discrimination, for example, one court has held that the application
of Title VII to religious employers violates the establishment clause, 1°6 while others
have held that such an application creates no constitutional difficulties. 107 Some courts,
noting Title VII's explicit exemption for religious-based discrimination, have ap-
96. See Donovan v. Central Baptist Church, 96 F.R.D. 4 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Turner v. Unitarian Church, 473 F.
Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978).
97. See Volunteers of America-Minnesota--Bar None Boys Ranch v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 345 (8th Cir. 1985)
(residential treatment center for children); Volunteers of America, Los Angeles v. NLRB, 777 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1985)
(church alcohol service division); Universidad Central de Bayamon v. NLRB, 778 F.2d 906 (1st Cit. 1985) (university)
(case withdrawn from publication); NLRB v. Salvation Army, 763 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1985) (day care center); St. Elizabeth
Community Hosp. v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1983) (religious hospital). See also Catholic High School Ass'n
of the Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161 (2d. Cir. 1985) (upholding jurisdiction of state labor relations board
over parochial school).
98. See, e.g., Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979); Attorney Gen. v. Bailey, 386 Mass.
367, 436 N.E.2d 139 (1982).
99. See SEC v. Knopfler, 658 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 908 (1982).
100. See, e.g., Taylor v. Knoxville, 566 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); Donovan v. Central Baptist Church, 96
F.R.D. 4 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
101. See, e.g., Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1439 (1984); United
States v. Coates, 692 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Grayson County State Bank, 656 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir.
1981); United States v. Holmes, 614 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980); Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir.
1979).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Church of World Peace, 775 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Freedom
Church, 613 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1979); Middleton v. United States, 609 F. Supp. 1045 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Gothic
Evangelical Church v. United States, 600 F. Supp. 358 (D. Minn. 1984).
103. See, e.g., Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Bd. of Educ., 368 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa 1985); Sheridan
Rd. Baptist Church v. Department of Educ., 132 Mich. App. 1, 348 N.W.2d 263 (1984); New Jersey State Bd. of Educ.
v. Shelton College, 90 N.J. 470, 448 A.2d 988 (1982).
104. See, e.g., Congregation Beth Yitzchok of Rockland v. Town of Ramapo, 593 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, 683 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. 1984).
105. See Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church v. Department of Educ., 132 Mich. App. 1, 348 N.W.2d 263 (1984).
106. See Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171-72 (4th Cir. 1985); see also
Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 . Ct. 2718 (1986).
Another court would hold such an application of Title VII unconstitutional only as applied to ministerial/pastoral
employees of the church. See EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981).
107. EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ'g Ass'n., 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d
477 (5th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, 609 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Amos v. Corporation of
Presiding Bishop, 594 F. Supp. 791 (D. Utah 1984); Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974 (D. Mass.
1983); Russell v. Belmont College, 554 F. Supp. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); Dolter v. Wahlert High School, 483 F. Supp.
266 (N.D. Iowa 1980); Hazen v. Catholic Credit Union, 37 Wash. App. 502, 681 P.2d 856 (1984).
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proved the right of religious employers to discriminate on religious grounds. os Others
have addressed the issue whether this exemption may itself raise establishment clause
problems, 10 9 and several cases have held that the exemption violates the establishment
clause when applied to employees performing secular, nonreligious activities. 11o
Courts also disagree as to the proper course to follow when it is unclear whether the
alleged discrimination was religiously motivated. Some courts hold that the church
may raise either the free exercise or establishment clause as an affirmative defense to
an EEOC proceeding,"' while others find that the arguable presence of religious
motive is sufficient to preclude EEOC jurisdiction over the dispute." 2
In the context of religious organizations' objections to summons presented by the
IRS for the purpose of determining the tax exempt status of a church, the results are
slightly more consistent, but doctrinal confusion remains. Most courts agree that so
long as the summons requires the church to produce only the documentation necessary
to a determination of its tax liability, no first amendment objection will be permitted."t 3
Other courts have extended their approval to summons that were limited to relevant
materials. 114 Summons seeking the membership lists of churches, all correspondence
files during a given time period, and minutes of directors'/officers' meetings, on the
other hand, generally have been invalidated."15 Yet, courts reaching similar results
have done so on a variety of dissimilar grounds, some appearing to use entanglement
notions to support a free exercise conclusion," 6 others resting on undifferentiated first
amendment grounds, 1 7 and still others relying on the church's associational rights.118
108. See Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974 (D. Mass. 1983); Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's
College, 495 F. Supp. 724 (D. Md. 1980).
109. See Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974 (D. Mass. 1983); Hazen v. Catholic Credit
Union, 37 Wash. App. 502, 681 P.2d 856 (1984).
110. See Amos v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 594 F. Supp. 791 (D. Utah 1984). See also Isaac v. Butler's
Shoe Corp., 511 F. Supp. 108, 112 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (holding that the accommodation provision of the Civil Rights Act
violates the establishment clause); Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 489 F. Supp. 782, 784-91
(S.D. Cal. 1980) (same); Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 428 F. Supp. 763 (C.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd on other grounds,
602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980) (same). However, other courts have held that the
accommodation provisions of Title VII are constitutional. Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1246 (9th
Cir. 1981); Nottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 643 F.2d 445,453--55 (7th Cir. 1981); McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, 509 F. Supp.
1055 (W.D. Mich. 1981).
111. See Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 495 F. Supp. 724 (D. Md. 1980).
112. See Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct.
2718 (1986); Raybum v. General Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985); EEOC v.
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 198 1); Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 481 N.E.2d
1160 (Mass. 1985).
113. See United States v. Church of World Peace, 775 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Coates, 692 F.2d
629 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Holmes, 614 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Life Science Church of Am.,
363 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1980).
114. See United States v. Grayson County State Bank, 656 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 920
(1982); United States v. Freedom Church, 613 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1979).
115. See United States v. Holmes, 614 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Life Science Church of Am., 636
F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1980).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Grayson County State Bank, 656 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
920 (1982).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Church of World Peace, 775 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Life
Science Church of Am., 636 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1980); Assembly of Yahveh Beth Israel v. United States, 592 F. Supp.
1257 (Coo. 1984).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Freedom Church, 613 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1979); Middleton v. United States, 609
F. Supp. 1047 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Gothic Evangelical Church v. United States, 600 F. Supp. 359 (D. Minn. 1984).
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The fate of teacher certification, curriculum, and licensing requirements as
applied to parochial schools generally has been favorable, with most courts rejecting
challenges based on free exercise, 19 establishment, 120 and authority' 2' grounds.
However, there are exceptions to this general trend. One court invalidated state
curriculum standards as a violation of free exercise principles, 22 and.ranother court
struck down teacher certification, accreditation, and textbook approval requirements
as applied to church schools based on a unique provision in its state constitution,
which gave parents the right to remove their children from any school to which they
conscientiously objected. 123
The constitutionality of compulsory attendance requirements as applied to
parochial schools and parents who wish to teach their children at home for religious
reasons is similarly unresolved. Some courts have upheld state compulsory education
laws over challenges based on the free exercise clause, 124 the establishment clause, 125
associational rights, 26 and the argument that the state lacks authority to promulgate
compulsory education laws. 27 Other courts have placed the burden of showing least
restrictive means and the absence of excessive entanglement on the state, 28 and one
court has declared compulsory attendance requirements unconstitutional as applied to
a non-Amish parent whose child was being taught in an Amish school by an
uncertified teacher. 129 This court concluded that, since the minimum standards of the
state were broader than necessary to assure the state's legitimate interest in the child's
education, the application of those minimum standards to the parents infringed their
free exercise rights.' 30 It appears that, at the very least, a parent challenging a
compulsory education requirement on free exercise grounds must show that public
education, certified teachers, or state-required courses would substantially interfere
with their religious beliefs.' 3' It is unclear precisely what constitutes excessive
entanglement in this context, but one court has held that requiring the supervisory
officers of a church school to disclose the name, age, and residence of each child
119. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d 220 (N.D. 1982); Jernigan v. State, 412 So. 2d 1242 (Ala.
App. 1982); State ex rel. McLemore v. Clarksville School of Theology, 636 S.W. 2d 706 (Tenn. 1982).
120. See, e.g., Windsor Park Baptist Church v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 658 F.2d 618 (8th Cir. 1981); Sheridan
Road Baptist Church v. Department of Educ., 132 Mich. App. 1, 348 N.W.2d 263 (1984); New Jersey Bd. of Educ. v.
Shelton College, 90 N.J. 470, 448 A.2d 988 (1982).
121. See, e.g., Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church v. Department of Educ., 132 Mich. App. 1,348 N.W.2d 263 (1984).
122. See State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976).
123. See Kentucky State Bd. for Elem. & Second. Educ. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877, 882-83 (Ky. 1979).
124. See, e.g., Jernigan v. State, 412 So. 2d 1242 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D.
1980); Meyerkorth v. State, 173 Neb. 889, 115 N.W.2d 585 (1962), appeal dismissed, 372 U.S. 705 (1963). See also
State ex rel. Kandt v. North Platte Baptist Church, 216 Neb. 684, 345 N.W.2d 19 (1984).
125. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 436 N.E.2d 139 (1982). See also Mazanec v. North
Judson-San Pierre School Corp., 763 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding abstention below improper and remanding for a
decision on the merits); Bangor Baptist Church v. Maine, 549 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Me. 1982) (refusing summary judgment
on free exercise and establishment issues since state had not shown least restrictive means or absence of entanglement).
126. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 436 N.E.2d 139 (1982).
127. See, e.g., Meyerkorth v. State, 173 Neb. 889, 115 N.W.2d 585 (1962).
128. See, e.g., Bangor Baptist Church v. Maine, 549 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Me. 1982).
129. See State ex rel. Nagle v. Olin, 64 Ohio St. 2d 341,415 N.E.2d 279 (1980), (relying on State v. Whisner, 47
Ohio St. 2d 181 (1976)).
130. Id. at 355, 415 N.E.2d at 288.
131. See Jemigan v. State, 412 So. 2d 1242 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D.
1980).
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attending the school does not entail the "continuing monitoring or potential for
regulating the religious activity" 1 32 ostensibly forbidden by the establishment clause.
The inconsistency among courts within each specific area, however, is only a
symptom of the actual problem. Confusion exists because few courts have endeav-
ored to examine whether a regulatory establishment claim presents a proper
constitutional concern. Rather, when parties allege establishment claims, the courts
tend to apply Lemon without asking whether the claim presents a relevant issue.
Similarly, in FCC,133 solicitation,1 34 and zoning135 cases, where the challenged
enactments generally have been summarily upheld against establishment attack,
courts have failed to analyze whether establishment claims are pertinent or why these
areas are apparently less susceptible to constitutional challenge than employment
discrimination or parochial school requirements. A theoretical perspective from
which the regulatory establishment claim may be evaluated, therefore, is sorely
needed.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE As A BARRIER TO GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
Despite precedent in its favor, the argument that the establishment clause
properly may limit governmental regulation of religious institutions faces immediate
obstacles. Semantically, it is difficult to reconcile a prohibition on establishment with
a prohibition on regulation. Establishment connotes support or endorsement.13 6 It is
somewhat illogical to maintain that government is supporting a religious institution
by forcing it to comply with regulatory requirements.
Substantively, using the establishment clause to protect religious institutions
from government regulation, even if suggested by occasional dicta, is also funda-
mentally incompatible with the Supreme Court's approach to establishment issues.
The results consistently reached in establishment cases accord with the clause's
semantic connotation-that relevant inquiry is whether the challenged governmental
action benefits or endorses religion.1 37 Moreover, as will be discussed in a later
section,1 38 the Lemon test, 139 despite language seemingly favorable to the regulatory
establishment theory, would have to be altered drastically to accommodate that
132. Attorney Gen. v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 436 N.E.2d 139 (1982).
133. See, e.g., Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984); King's
Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974); Brandywine-Main Line Radio
v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973). See generally Hardy & Secrest, Religious
Freedom and the Federal Communications Commission, 16 VA.L. U.L. REv. 57 (1981).
134. See, e.g., Taylor v. City of Knoxville, 566 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); Sylte v. Metropolitan Gov't of
Nashville, 493 F. Supp. 313 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
135. See, e.g., Lakewood Congreg. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983);
Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984).
136. Cf. Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the
Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLuM. L Rev. 1373, 1382 (1981).
137. See generally Marshall, "We Know It When We See It:" The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 USC L.
REv. 499 (1986); cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 105
S. Ct. 2479, 2501 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
138. See infra Part I(B).
139. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); supra text accompanying note 27.
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theory. 40 Without alteration, the protection accorded religious institutions from any
regulatory effort would be essentially absolute, regardless of countervailing policy
considerations. 141
Finally, the view that the establishment clause protects religious institutions
from government regulation reflects a philosophical and historical understanding of
the first amendment not shared by the Court. As Professor Mark DeWolfe Howe has
noted, the Court has been guided in its establishment jurisprudence primarily by the
political, rationalist views of Thomas Jefferson, who envisioned the first amendment
as protecting individual interests by freeing government from the incursion and
dominance of religion. 42 The theory supporting the proposition that the establish-
ment clause protects religion from government, on the other hand, is essentially
theological, not rationalist, and its architect is Roger Williams, 143 not Jefferson. Its
basis, moreover, is not one of protecting political freedom, but rather "a principle of
theology" that "a church dependent on governmental favor cannot be true to its
better self."' 44
The argument that the establishment clause protects religion from government
regulation, then, has no basis in current establishment understanding; it postulates
only what that understanding ought to be. The case for its acceptance, however, is
fraught with difficulties beyond the simply precedential.
Certainly, the claim that some religious activities are protected presents no
controversy. The first amendment requires freedom for the theological activities of
churches. 45 Acceptance of this principle, however, does not inexorably lead to
church freedom from government regulations under establishment principles, nor
does it suggest that all church activities merit constitutional protection. The essential
concern of Williams' theory of religious freedom, after all, is that the state not
interfere with religious conscience and theology' 46 -matters protected without
recourse to the establishment clause. Other first amendment provisions, notably the
free exercise' 47 and free speech clauses, 148 protect religious exercise and ensure that
the state does not interfere with theological doctrine and decisions.1 49
140. See infra notes 238-44 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
142. M. HohE, THE GARDN Aa THE Wamr-os (1965).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 7-8. To some degree, even Williams' theory does not support the broad claim for protection of religious
institutions addressed in this Article. At the core of Williams' theory was a concern for the protection of individual
religious exercise rather than the protection of so-called "corporate" religion itself. See Smith, supra note 19, at 113
(citing S. Am-xmos, A Rauetous HITroRY OF mm Auc.AN PEOPLE, ch. 23 (1975)). See also J. MuRRAY, WE HOLD THEsE
Teirrs 49-53 (1960); T. SANDEas, Poxrm'Arr Cosca, rs OF CHRecN AND STATR 185-91 (1964).
145. Laycock, supra note 136, at 1386 nn.108-09 and authorities cited therein.
146. M. Howe, supra note 142, at 6; Esbeck, supra note 1, at 357-58.
147. U.S. Co.sr., amend. I, cl. 2, Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
148. U.S. Co.sr., amend. I, cl. 3. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise
Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MIN. L. REv. 545, 558 (1983).
149. Laycock suggests that free exercise analysis may be too rigid since, if taken literally (that is, applied only to
matters of doctrine), such obviously religious practices as choir singing and the rosary might be removed from
constitutional protection. See Laycock, supra note 136, at 1390. Free exercise protection appropriately has been applied
to religious practices that have no specific bases in dogma. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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Proponents of the regulatory establishment view argue that religious institutions
should be protected beyond the limits of current constitutional interpretation and,
indeed, beyond the parameters of the theory that purportedly provides the argument
with its philosophical base. Claims for constituitional protection of the integrity and
inviolability of religious practice and dogma do not appear, at least directly, to relate
to claims for the constitutional protection of public fundraising, politics, commercial
enterprise, and operation of broadcast media. Nor does a theory concerned with
government intrusion into matters of religious doctrine immediately suggest that the
tenets of religious organizations would be violated by any proposed contact with
government, no matter how innocuous or routine the intrusion.
Nonetheless, forceful arguments have been advanced to the effect that even
seemingly innocuous governmental regulation of any activity undertaken by religious
entities may be an improper intrusion into theological affairs. Professor Douglas
Laycock expresses this idea in his argument that all activities of religious institutions
should be protected under a free exercise principle of church autonomy (rather than
under any establishment principle): "When the state interferes with the autonomy of
,a church, and particularly when it interferes with the allocation of authority and
influence within a church, it interferes with the very process of forming the religion
as it will exist in the future." 150 For Laycock, the risk attending such interference,
and the subsequent necessity for constitutional protection, arises in all church
activities, including the "most routine" matters. 15' Professor Carl Esbeck has
assumed a similar position, arguing that establishment does protect religious
institutions from state regulatory efforts: "If a church or other religious organization
is unduly involved with the agencies of government, it may become subverted and
redirect its programs to meet ends chosen by government. Accordingly, the church
becomes compromised in its efforts to act in accord with its higher calling." 52
Undoubtedly, there is merit to Laycock's and Esbeck's contention. Regulatory
requirements may have an indirect and subtle effect on theological development. As
Laycock points out, doctrinal change is fluid and subject to influence by a wide range
of factors; 153 thus, it is not difficult to envision how regulatory requirements might
affect this process. Whatever might be said in their defense, regulatory programs are
often burdensome and the natural inclination of any regulated entity is often to adjust
voluntarily the way it operates in order to promote its own ease of compliance. At
times, the effect may be totally subconscious, as when a regulated entity pigeonholes
an activity into a classification set forth on a reporting form. 54 At other times, the
150. Laycock, supra note 136, at 1391. Laycock's theory of church autonomy coincides in result, if not in rationale,
with the regulatory establishment model, since he posits that all activities of religious institutions are protected. Since
many of Laycock's arguments support the regulatory establishment position, and since his conclusion-that all activities
of religious institutions are protected-contrasts the central thesis of this Article, his free exercise position will be
addressed along with the claim for regulatory establishment.
151. Id. at 1397. Laycock's theory, it must be noted, is not based solely on the protection of doctrinal development
but also stems from his broad understanding of what is religion. See id. at 1390-91.
152. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 374. See also id. at 378.
153. Laycock, supra note 136, at 1391.
154. See Carlson, Regulators andReligion: Caesar's Revenge, 3 RE~uAmoN 27, 31 (May/June 1979); Esbeck, supra
note 1, at 368.
[Vol. 47:293
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE LIMITS ON RELIGION
decision may be more conscious, as when a church faces the choice of either
characterizing a "pious custom" as theologically-based or risks having the practice
subject to regulatory sanction.' 55
Presumably, both Laycock and Esbeck would agree that the purpose behind
protecting all activities undertaken by religious institutions is to some extent
prophylactic. For example, it is unlikely that, in most cases, complying with routine
reporting and recordkeeping requirements, such as those required by the EEOC or by
state agencies monitoring public fundraising, would influence or jeopardize religious
doctrine.' 56 Nonetheless, Laycock explains, broad protection is necessary because
the development of doctrine is such an amorphous process that determining what
government actions will induce changes is "too unpredictable [to be resolved] on a
case-by-case basis." 157
It is inviting to criticize this indirect theological effect thesis on the ground that
it deals only with speculative harm and is therefore too attenuated a construct.15 8 This
criticism, however, would be misguided. The basic thrust of the indirect effect theory
is that theological development is a process. Thus, any interference with that process
is an actual infringement on theological concerns.
The better response to this theory is that theological development is not itself
theology, or, even if it is theology, ephemeral development of doctrine cannot
properly be held to be within the ambit of first amendment protection. An equally
persuasive argument is that the genesis and development of theological principles is
a process no different from the development of political, artistic, or literary ideas in
the secular world. The mere fact that secular affiliations or organizations may develop
ideas through the interactive process does not embue these groups with constitutional
interests. 5 9 Indeed, even direct and conscious attempts by the press to advance and
disseminate ideas through information gathering has been held unentitled to special
first amendment protection. 16 The proposition, then, that the process of theological
development should be singled out for special treatment appears to be without
justification. 161
Perhaps the best refutation of the indirect theological effect position, however,
rests with the premise itself. Once the assumption is made that the process of
theological development must be protected, the argument becomes too broad to be
meaningful. Undoubtedly, any government action, be it regulation of a religious
entity, the use of nuclear weapons, or laws against discrimination, can be a stimulus
155. See Laycock, supra note 136, at 1391.
156. Cf. Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 105 S. Ct. 1953, 1964 (1985).
157. Laycock, supra note 136, at 1392.
158. Cf. Ripple, supra note 2, at 1217.
159. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (group of students sharing living quarters raises
no constitutional interest); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 465 U.S. 1077 (1984) (right of association not protected
unless directly related to the advocacy of articulated positions); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 464 U.S. 959 (1984)
(association within a law frmn raises no first amendment interest). See also Karst, The Freedom ofIntimate Association,
89 YAts L.J. 624, 654 (1980).
160. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
161. On rejecting the notion that religious ideas are entitled to greater protection than secular ideas, see Marshall,
supra note 137, at 575-88.
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to theological change and development. Indeed, government action influences
philosophical and moral standards throughout society simply by its role and visibility
in our culture.' 62
Religion, then, although it can and should be free from government coercion,
cannot be insulated from government action that might affect religious values. This,
of course, does not leave religion at the state's mercy. In the absence of coercion, the
religious institution itself ultimately determines whether to be theologically influ-
enced by governmental or societal action. This is the fallacy of the indirect effect
argument. It seeks not to protect church from government, but rather to protect
religious institutions from matters within their own volition.
Beyond a concern for theological development, the argument that all activities
of religious institutions should be constitutionally protected has been supported by the
principle of non-entanglement.1 63 The non-entanglement position has obtained some
measure of success in the Supreme Court. Codified in the third prong of the Lemon
establishment test,164 it has been used potently to invalidate a number of aids to
parochial education, 165 although it has never been applied against a regulatory
program. Non-entanglement also has occasionally surfaced as a free exercise concern
in some cases, and in the writings of commentators.1 6
When the Court first applied the test in Walz v. Tax Commission,167 entangle-
ment appeared to represent two distinct concerns. First, the inquiry into the degree of
government involvement with religion was intended to enforce the second or effect
prong of the then-existing establishment test. As the Walz Court stated, it "must also
be sure that the end result-the effect-is not an excessive government entanglement
with religion."' 68 Second, and more broadly, the entanglement concern was
presented as a natural development of the Court's struggle "to find a neutral course
between the two Religion Clauses .... ,1169 Minimizing a "continuing day-to-day
relationship" between church and state became a method of steering between the dual
proscriptions of sponsorship and interference toward a policy of neutrality.' 70
Although some commentators have objected to the use of entanglement as a
separate constitutional test,171 the notion that church-state entanglement may raise
establishment effects concerns is not controversial. As the Court explained in Lemon
v. Kurtzman, entanglement may provide an early warning for potential violations of
162. T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLs oF Govma,:mr (1935); M. -DELmAN, TiH SYmnouC UsEs oF POwER 105-27 (1964);
Bellah, Civil Religion in America, in REuoioN LN AMRmucA (1968). For an analysis of the role of Court and Constitution in
influencing our societal values, see Lerner, Constitution and Court As Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290 (1937); Levinson,
"The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 123.
163. See Esbeck, supra note 1, at 382.
164. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
165. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985); Wolman v. Walters, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
166. See Laycock, supra note 136, at 1384; Serritella, supra note 12, at 144-60.
167. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
168. Id. at 674.
169. Id. at 668.
170. Id. at 674.
171. See Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3248 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See Choper, The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673-74 (1980).
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the effect test. 172 In this respect, entanglement is particularly pertinent in cases where
"government support... comes with strings attached."' 173 Lemon was such a case.
There, the Court considered two private school aid programs, one in Rhode Island,
the other in Pennslyvania. Both programs provided direct financial support for
teachers at elementary and secondary schools. In Rhode Island, the statute authorized
the state to supplement the pay of parochial school teachers who taught secular
subjects. 174 Under the Pennslyvania statute, the state attempted to reimburse
nonpublic schools for the costs of educating their students in secular courses by
purchasing instruction from those schools in science, math, language, and physical
education courses. In both cases, in order to ensure that state funds were applied only
to secular matters, the schools were required to account separately for their
expenditures in teaching the secular subjects and to allow state auditing of those
records. 175 The Court found these "enforcement" provisions to be constitutionally
objectionable under the entanglement inquiry.176
The use of entanglement analysis in cases like Lemon, when ongoing state
supervision is required, has a sound foundation. When government support and
control are inextricably linked in the challenged government enactment, it seems
"natural to review support and control as a package. . ... ,177 The fact that
government imposes and enforces limits on the aid does little to remove the symbolic
union of church and state thought to connote establishment. 178 Indeed, when
regulations intertwine government and religion in a program designed to benefit
religion, the effect may be to send a more powerful message of state endorsement of
religion than might occur from aid alone. More importantly, however, the establish-
ment problem in Lemon and its progeny is in the aid, not the regulation. 179 Thus, the
justification for entanglement analysis of regulatory issues must lie elsewhere.
One possibility is the second theme of Walz' 80 -that entanglement is a product
172. 403 U.S. 602, 624-25 (1971); see also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970); Ripple, supra note
2, at 1197 (arguing that the nonentanglement doctrine as used in Walz might have been construed as a "pragmatic
rephrasing of the 'primary effect' test").
173. Laycock, supra note 136, at 1382.
174. 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971). The teachers were eligible to receive direct payments of up to 15% of their annual
salary, so long as the salary did not exceed the maximum paid to public school teachers. However, teachers were not
eligible for the supplements if the private school's average per-pupil expenditures on secular subjects exceeded
comparable figures for public schools. Id.
175. Id. at 620.
176. Id. at 621-22. Other cases have invalidated similar enforcement provisions under the Lemon reasoning. In
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), Pennsylvania's program for supplying remedial and accelerated instruction, as
well as guidance counseling, to students in the non-public schools was invalidated because the state would have had to
assure that the teachers would "play a strictly non-ideological role." 421 U.S. 349, 371 (1975). In Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229 (1977), the Court again used entanglement grounds to invalidate Ohio's provision of field trip transportation
and services to non-public schools. Again, because non-public school teachers would be on the buses taking children
between school and their destination, the state would have to assure secular use of the field trip funds. 433 U.S. 229, 255
(1977). Most recently, the Court invalidated New York's use of federal funds to supply remedial instruction to
low-income, educationally disadvantaged children because the instruction would take place in private schools and the
publicly paid teachers would have to be policed to assure that their message was devoid of religious content. Aguilar v.
Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3238 (1985).
177. Laycock, supra note 136, at 1383 (noting the doctrinal confusion that has resulted).
178. See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3226-27 (1985).
179. Laycock, supra note 136, at 1383.
180. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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of the Court's attempt to find a neutral path between establishment and free exercise.
If so, it reflects a basic, structural concern about the general relationship of church
and state. It does not focus upon protecting government from religion or religion from
government. Instead, the Court's approach in Walz tends to equate separation with
neutrality, thereby making the degree of separation a litmus for compliance with the
dual commands of the religion clauses. There is little wonder, therefore, that some
commentators have criticized this application of entanglement as potentially, and
incorrectly, representing "the full meaning of the religion clauses."' 8'
The separation test, however, which ostensibly embodies the commands of both
clauses, provides no support for applying either clause to any aspect of the
church-state relationship. As a measure of neutrality, entanglement does little to aid
assessment of whether a church is being supported by the state or hindered by it. Each
possibility is a distinct question. Consequently, the substitution of entanglement
considerations for neutrality analysis provides no support for applying the establish-
ment clause to cases involving regulation of religiously affiliated organizations.
Constitutional values must be more clearly identified in order to support the
claim for exemption. Several have been advanced. The strongest of these invokes
both free exercise and establishment concerns in attacking regulatory programs
which allow the state to determine whether certain activities are religiously based. In
Catholic Bishop, 82 for example, the concern was raised that the NLRB would at
times be placed in a position to evaluate when the allegedly unfair labor practice of
a religious school was based on religious beliefs.' 83 Arguably, this inquiry raises
establishment concerns on the grounds that the state has no competency to make
theological determinations. 84 It potentially also raises free exercise concerns, in that
a wrong determination by the state may violate free exercise principles. 85
As we have seen, the claim that inquiry itself may raise a constitutional violation
was apparently rejected in Dayton Christian Schools.'86 Nonetheless, it is a claim that
had previously enjoyed some support in the case law, and because of the ambiguous
nature of the Dayton Christian Schools holding, should still be addressed. 87 In
parochial aid cases, for example, it has played a major part in the invalidation of
programs which require a state to monitor religious school expenditures in order to
ascertain when the monies were devoted to secular or sectarian purposes. 8 8 Outside
the realm of the aid cases, constitutional limitations on state involvement in religious
doctrine have again been imposed. Cases involving intrachurch disputes over
181. Laycock, supra note 136, at 1379; Ripple, supra note 2, at 1213-14.
182. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
183. Id. at 502.
184. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
185. Laycock, supra note 136, at 1400-01.
186. See supra notes 71-88 and accompanying text.
187. Id.
188. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
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property 8 9 are principal examples of the courts' lack of authority under the first
amendment to resolve church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine.19 0
The property dispute cases are enlightening, however, in that they show that
limitations upon inquiry into church doctrine are not absolute. The courts may not
resolve doctrinal disputes but they may apply "neutral principles of law" 19 1 to
resolve litigation, even if this application "requires a civil court to examine certain
religious documents" in order to reach its conclusions. 192 As the Court in Jones v.
Wolf stated, the neutral principles inquiry "cannot be said to 'inhibit' the free
exercise of religion, any more than do other neutral provisions of state law governing
the manner in which churches own property, hire employees, or purchase goods." 193
The point of Jones appears to be that, while the state may not make a theological
determination on behalf of the church, it may inquire, based upon secular analysis,
whether the church's theological position governs the disputed issue. Simply stated,
the distinction is between the prohibited determination of what is religiously correct
and the more limited, constitutionally permissible inquiry into the nature of the
religious claim.
The property cases, then, ultimately show that the Constitution does not prohibit
all government inquiry into the nature of a religious belief. Though it may well be "a
sensitive and unwelcome task,"' 194 this inquiry is one that essentially is inescapable.
Even creating a religious exemption from regulatory enactment will not eliminate all
inquiry, since the issue of whether an organization may be defined as religious must
be decided in any event to determine whether the organization is entitled to the
exemption. Similarly, in a free exercise challenge, the issue of the existence of
religious belief and sincerity must be determined in order to decide the merits of the
free exercise claim. If state or court inquiry into religious beliefs is entanglement,
then it is an entanglement that is required by the first amendment. 195
The impermissible inquiry claim then, can only seek to minimize the frequency
of court determination of religious issues. This may be of value, as one of us has
previously suggested. 196 But avoiding inquiry itself cannot be constitutionally
determinative. At best it represents a legitimate policy interest under which the state
189. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
190. An early property dispute between pro- and anti-slavery factions, involving the right to control a local
Presbyterian church, was decided on federal common law grounds before the first amendment was held applicable to the
states via the fourteenth amendment. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). Since Watson, the limitation on
government intrusion into religious doctrine in intrachurch property disputes has occasionally been held to stem from the
first amendment generally. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979). In other cases, the limitation is said to derive
from the free exercise clause. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). See also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
595, 616 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Because of the religious nature of these disputes, civil courts should decide
them according to principles that do not interfere with the free exercise of religion in accordance with church policy and
doctrine.").
191. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979). See also Adams & Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy
and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. Ray. 1291 (1980).
192. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979). /
193. Id. at 606.
194. Choper, supra note 171, at 683.
195. Id. See generally Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by
Religious Organizations, 79 Cottnr. L. Ray. 1514 (1979).
196. See Marshall, supra note 137, at 545, 589 (1983).
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might exempt religious organizations from some regulatory requirements if it so
chooses. 197 Indeed, perhaps this is the true significance of the Court's tortuous
statutory construction in its Catholic Bishop decision.
Other entanglement rationales that have been posited to support protection of all
church activity are similarly unconvincing. One theory argues that requiring religions
to comply with governmental regulatory efforts is inappropriate because religious
institutions should not be accountable to a secular authority. As Dean Kelley and
Professor Marvin Braiterman have argued with respect to reporting requirements:
[Mandatory disclosure] is pernicious because it encourages in the public mind the erroneous
notion that religious organizations are obliged to account to the public or to a public official
for their beliefs or their activities. Certainly religious groups ought to be accountable, and
they are, but not to the public or to public officials. They are accountable to their members
and contributors.1s
An immediate difficulty with Kelley's and Braiterman's argument is that in
many cases it is descriptively inaccurate. Particularly with regard to fundraising, the
religious ministry is often not accountable to a private membership. Most, if not all,
fundraising consists of pleas to the general public. Should these organizations be
unaccountable to the public, they would not be accountable at all.
The accountability argument also dramatically overstates the case. At some
point, religious organizations must become accountable for at least some of their
actions. Kelley and Braiterman, for example, do not argue that religion should be
exempt from the normal processes of the criminal law. 199 Thus, the question is not
whether religious organizations should be accountable; it is where the line of
accountability should be drawn.
Finally, while religious organizations should not be accountable to the public for
their beliefs, it does not follow that it is pernicious for those groups to be accountable
to the public for their non-religious activities. In fact, the argument could be made
that it is pernicious to encourage in the public mind the concept that one can escape
various forms of regulation in the name of religion. The suggestion that a ready-made
loophole exists for those who wish to describe themselves as religious adherents is not
only damaging to governmental interests, but it is detrimental to religion as well.2 0
The increasing proliferation of dubious religious claims of exemption from taxation
or other regulatory requirements has probably done as much damage to the image of
religion as it has to undercut the enforcement capabilities of the challenged
governmental program. 20'
A final entanglement rationale suggests that minimizing the contacts between
church and state by exempting the former from the regulatory process eliminates
197. Id. at 583 n.200.
198. Braiterman & Kelley, When Is Governmental Intervention Legitimate?, in Govrm.-sENr INtrvE~riN tRaious
Anxss 170, 184 (D. Kelley ed. 1982).
199. Id. at 171.
200. See Bagni, supra note 195, at 1542. Cf. United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 443 (D.D.C. 1968).
201. Compare More v. CIR, 774 F.2d 570, 571 (1985) in which Judge Kaufman rather resignedly states, "Each
year, with renewed vigor, many citizens seek sanctuary in the free exercise clause of the first amendment. They desire
salvation not from sin or from temptation, however, but from the most earthly of mortal duties-income taxes."
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friction between the two domains. Even this goal does not inevitably require
regulatory establishment protections. First of all, in a complex society, some contact
betwen church and state is inevitable. 202 Since this goal does not support a claim for
full separation, the issue is where to draw the line. Moreover, excluding religion from
regulatory programs applicable to other segments of the society can create new
problems. Favored treatment, or what is perceived as favored treatment, creates
resentment. Indeed, some commentators believe that it is exemption from regulatory
programs that creates the true establishment concern.203
More importantly, if the elimination of friction between church and state were
to become enshrined as a constitutional principle, the detrimental effect would
probably be greater on religion than on the state. The logical extension of the
separation principle would "prevent religious people and organizations from partic-
ipating in the political process in any way." 204 Notably, many Supreme Court
discussions of religious strife and divisiveness have occurred in cases in which the
political role of institutional religion was questioned under the general heading of
"political entanglement." 205
Ultimately, the argument fails because it miscomprehends the role of religious
institutions in contemporary society. As noted in the next section, organized religion
represents an increasingly pervasive force in all elements of the society, including
politics, commercial enterprise, and social welfare. The separation model might
apply if church activity were confined to the "hallowed precincts of chapel, croft and
chantry," 206 but it is one-sided at best to insist that legitimate state regulation must
recede each time a religious organization extends its activity. The state does not
create friction alone.20 7
III. ESTABLISHMENT As A BARRIER TO REGULATION OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS-
THE COUNTERVAILING CONCERNS
The previous discussion demonstrates the weakness of arguments for the
application of the establishment clause to protect all activities of religious institutions
from government regulations. While legitimate concerns surrounding the application
of regulatory laws to religious institutions exist, the conclusion that these concerns
202. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
203. Tribe, Church and State in the Constitution, in GovERnMFMr INrvEr;mo..N t Raucious Ansmms 31, 34 (D. Kelley
ed. 1982). See Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 594 F.
Supp. 791 (D. Utah 1984); Isaac v. Butler's Shoe Corp., 511 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Anderson v. General
Dynamics Corvair Aerospace Div., 489 F. Supp. 782 (S.D. Cal. 1980); King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974). See also Miller, Rendering Unto Caesar: Religious Publishers and the Public
Benefit Rule, 134 Penn. L. Rev. 433 (1986).
204. Gedicks, Motivation, Rationality, and Secular Purpose in Establishment Clause Review, 1985 ARus. ST. L.J.
677, 687 (1985). See also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); Laycock, supra note 136, at 1379 n.62 and authorities
cited therein. But see Esbeck, Religion and a Neutral State: Imperative or Impossibility, 15 Colum. L. Rev. 66 (1985).
205. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). But see Gaffney, Political
Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 205 (1980).
206. Kelley, Introduction to Govimmowair lrmmvisnoN s N Rmuous AsmsAs 3 (D. Kelley ed. 1982).
207. See Miller, supra note 203, at 433 ("Religion creates some of its most intractable problems for the State when
it engages in commercial or other traditionally secular activities.").
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warrant constitutional protection does not necessarily follow. The case against the
regulatory establishment position, however, relies not only upon refutation of the
arguments in its favor, but also on consideration of the harms to regulatory efforts and
to other constitutional values that would occur if the regulatory establishment position
was adopted.
A. The Wall That Isn't-Religious Institutions in Contemporary Society
The significance of the claim that all activities of religious institutions are
entitled to constitutional protection cannot be understood without some understanding
of the power and influence currently enjoyed by religious institutions in all aspects of
society. To some degree, a complete depiction of "the religious empire" 203 cannot
be drawn because of the secrecy surrounding most church holdings and financial
operations. 20 9 Even so, the relatively limited available information offers staggering
numbers and conclusions. The sheer magnitude of corporate religion alone would
explain why governmental regulators have taken more than a casual interest. Church
holdings are immense. Ten years ago the value of church-held tax-exempt property
was estimated to be 155 billion dollars, and this value is increasing.2 10 These holdings
render a confrontation between land use regulators, local tax authorities, and
churches virtually inevitable. 25
208. LAnsoN & LowEZL, THE Rsmuaous E5%wa 1 (1976).
209. Id. at 220. See also C. PAtsrsaEo, VATIcAN FeRscss viii-xii (1971); Power, Glory-and Politics, Time, Feb.
17, 1986, at 67; Lindsey, The Mormons: Growth, Prosperity and Controversy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1986, § 6, at 38,
col. 1.
210. LAMso & LowEu, supra note 208, at 3-4.
211. This Article does not extensively discuss the land use regulation cases, because they have been analyzed only
infrequently under establishment principles. However, the importance of churches as property holders cannot be denied.
In large measure, the constitutional principles controlling disputes between church and state regarding the use of property
have been settled. Nondiscriminatory regulations applied to church construction generally have survived challenges based
on the religion clauses. See, e.g., Medford Assembly of God v. City of Medford, 695 P.2d 1379, 72 Or. App. 333 (1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 570 (1985) (holding that requiring a church to obtain a conditional use permit before operating
a school does not infringe upon church's free exercise of religion; thus, state need not demonstrate a compelling interest);
Lakewood, Ohio Congreg. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 815 (1983) (rejecting free exercise challenge to exclusion of new church construction in residential zone); Gross v.
City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (Ilth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984) (rejecting free exercise challenge
to zoning ordinance that prohibited plaintiffs from using their residence for organized religious services); Corporation of
the Presiding Bishop v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (1949), appeal dismissed 338 U.S. 805
(1949) (dismissing a free exercise challenge to a municipal zoning ordinance preventing the building of churches in certain
areas, for want of a substantial federal question). See also Esbeck, supra note 1, at 398 n.309. Where the issue is the use
of an existing church structure, courts have been less consistent in enforcing the applicable restrictions. See, e.g., St.
John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, 195 N.J. Super. 414, 479 A.2d 935 (Law Div. 1983) (permitting
continued use of church shelter for the homeless despite failure to meet health and safety requirements applicable to
commercial enterprises, based upon historical use of churches as sanctuary for the destitute). Other cases have upheld the
requirement that churches obtain special use permits for intensive use of church-owned buildings in residential zones and
have enforced residential covenants against church-held property. See, e.g., Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of
World Christianity v. New Castle, 480 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Ireland v. Bible Baptist Church, 480 S.W.2d
467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). Cases have also arisen in particularly contemporary contexts, such as historic preservation.
See Note, Land Use Regulation and the Free Exercise Clause, 84 CoWM. L. Ray. 1562 (1984) (arguing that the free
exercise clause has been applied too narrowly, thus permitting the application of regulations in ways that implicate serious
free exercise coneers). Recently, a district court ruled that the incorporation of an Oregon town, which consisted of land
owned solely by a religious group, and which was established to serve the purposes of the group, was unconstitutional
as a violation of the establishment clause. State v. City of Rajneeshpuram, Civ. No. 84-359 (D. Or. Dec. 10, 1985)
(unreported transcript of Court's oral ruling).
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The financial growth and commercial expansion of churches provide a fertile
source of regulatory conflict. The Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN), begun in
the 1960s, already has receipts from solicitations, sales, and other endeavors that
amount to 233 million dollars per year; its success is paralleled by a host of other
organizations riding the crest of television evangelism. 21 2 As long as twenty years
ago, one writer reported that "sectarian groups... have taken deep plunges into
profit-making businesses.' '213 At the time, the holdings of various religious bodies
included an orchestra hall, office buildings, a cement block factory, department
stores, television and radio stations, a resort, a steel tube factory, a shopping center,
a girdle factory, and the land under Yankee Stadium. 214 More recently, it was
reported that the Unification Church held a ginseng tea company, a titanium firm, a
machine tool and weapons manufacturer, a tuna fleet, fish-processing plants, a
pharmaceuticals factory, and three daily newspapers. 215 The holdings of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints also illustrate the growing role of churches as
centers of economic power. In 1967, the church's Deseret Management Corporation,
created to oversee its income-producing companies, had holdings including a hotel,
a publishing company, a department store, several agri-businesses, real estate and
investment operations, and radio and television stations from coast to coast.21 6 More
recently, Mormon assets were estimated to exceed five billion dollars. 2 17
While the commercial holdings of religious organizations have spawned
regulatory conflict,218 commercial interest alone did not bring churches into the
worldly sphere. Contemporary churches, increasingly, contribute community ser-
vices. 219 In some instances, activities prompted by a sense of mission have resulted
in church-operated facilities possessing the attributes and affecting the same public
interests as state-operated social service agencies. 220 Child-care facilities, 221 homes
212. Power, Glor--and Politics, Time, Feb. 17, 1986, at 67.
213. A. BAL., THE RELIGION BUssN'ss 10 (1968).
214. Id. at 10-11.
215. See "Sun Myung Moon-Religious Martyr or Tax Cheat"?, U.S. News & World Report, May 28, 1984, at
14; "Moon's Japanese Profits Bolster Efforts in U.S.," Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1984, at Al, col. 3.
216. A. BALK, supra note 213, at 10; R. Gosisit & P. WILEY, A.mucA's SArsss: Tis RisE or MoRMoN Pow.R 105-14
(1984).
217. "Leaders of Mormonism Double As Overseers of a Financial Empire," Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1983, at 1,
col. 1.
218. The increasing proliferation of religiously operated enterprises is also evident in the diverse activities of the
Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. See also State v. Sports and Health
Club, 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986) (religiously operated health club denied
exemption from state antidiscrimination law).
219. See Carlson, supra note 154, at 34; Esbeck, supra note 1, at 410.
220. Carlson, supra note 154, at 29-30; Esbeck, supra note 1, at 376; Kelley, Introduction to Govaslsnr
ImlEvn noN IN Rsriious AFArRS 3, 78 (D. Kelley ed. 1982).
221. Day care services operated by churches have experienced substantial growth. In 1982, a survey by the National
Council of Churches revealed that more than 14,000 member-churches were directly responsible for the financing of
daycare services. NAT'L CoUNcI. OF CURcHsS, WHEN CHURcss MIo Ta CHeRaN 13 (1983). These services were available,
in most instances, to the general public, not just to members of the sponsoring church. Id. Indeed, the NCC estimated that
over a million children were enrolled in these centers. The estimate does not include children enrolled in facilities not
affiliated with the NCC, which include the nation's two largest denominations, the Roman Catholic Church and the
Southern Baptist Convention. Because child care implicates longstanding governmental interests, protecting the welfare
of children "is no mere corporate concern of official authority. It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole
community, that children be both safe-guarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and independent
well-developed citizens." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944). One can expect increased urging for
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for the aged,2 22 and hospital facilities223 are among the most familiar of these
enterprises in which religious organizations engage, yet these areas have traditionally
been the appropriate domain of government regulation.
The source of the most vitriolic confrontations, however, is likely to be the
fundraising and political activities of contemporary religious organizations. Already
the battles have begun over reporting and disclosure requirements. 224 The argument
in favor of at least some accountability is strong. Religious organizations in this
country traditionally have been the largest beneficiaries of private largesse. 225
Conservative estimates place contributions to those organizations in 1983 in excess of
thirty-five billion dollars-over forty-seven percent of all charitable giving. 226
The magnitude of the stakes involved, however, is not the only regulatory
concern. Some of the strongest arguments in favor of disclosure requirements concern
the fundraising techniques employed by some religious organizations. Fundraising no
longer occurs solely within the membership and physical boundaries of the organized
church. Organized fundraising through mass appeals has developed into a multimil-
lion dollar industry. Religious organizations have become adept marketers of their
message, increasingly using the direct-mail and broadcast techniques more frequently
associated with commercial and political enterprises. 227 Many of the most successful
fundraisers are so-called "electronic churches," using paid-time broadcasts or their
own networks to solicit funds. It has been a successful endeavor. A recent study
reported that the top four television ministries collectively took in more than a quarter
of a billion dollars in 1980.228
These factors implicate three distinct regulatory interests. The first is the need to
increase the flow of information to promote consumer-donor awareness. Here, the
government interest is essentially the same as in political campaign regulation and a
governmental regulation of all day care providers-including churches. See, e.g., Congregation Beth Yitzchok v. Town
of Ramapo, 593 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying request of religious nursery school for preliminary injunction
against enforcement of municipal regulatory ordinance).
222. Barr v. United Methodist Church, 90 Cal. App. 3d 259, 153 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1979); see Alton Newton
Evangelistic Ass'n v. South Carolina Employment Security Comm'n, 326 S.E.2d 165 (S.C. App. 1985).
223. See St. Elizabeth Community Hosp. v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1983); Congregation Beth Yitzchok
v. Town of Ramapo, 593 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, 683 S.W.2d
292 (Tex. 1984).
224. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Taylor v. City of Knoxville, 566 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Tenn. 1982);
Sylte v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, 493 F. Supp. 313 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). Some commentators have suggested that
churches need not be accountable to anyone but their members so long as their activities are lawful. See Braiterman &
Kelley, supra note 198, at 184.
225. See, e.g., Grvmo U.S.A., ANNuAL REPosT 44 (1985) (indicating that since 1955 the largest single category of
recipients of charitable contributions has been religious organizations).
226. Id. The figure is low because of the religiously affiliated institutions excluded from the estimate.
227. See Note, Mail Order Ministries: Application of the Religious Purpose Exemption Under the First Anendment,
17 J. MAR. 895, 912 (1984); Power, Glory-and Politics, Time, Feb. 17, 1986, at 62-69. Some churches use even more
enterprising techniques-including illegal casino gambling games--to obtain funds. One author labeled churches
"perhaps the principal proponents of gambling as a fundraising device." C. BArAL, CHApmv U.S.A. 333 (1979). The same
author has reported that some of New York City's houses of worship make as much as fifty million dollars a year through
these illegal games. See also J. Goum, WoRL Lv GooDs 62-63 (1971).
228. J. HADDm & C. SwAm, Pm TriE PasEACiMS 109 (1981). Another study has concluded that the aggregate
operating budgets of the top five television ministries is approximately 500 million dollars per year. Power, Glory-and
Politics, Time, Feb. 17, 1986, at 64.
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host of consumer-oriented disclosure requirements. 229 The choice of donees will be
affected by knowledge of how their money is spent. Without information, donors
cannot evaluate the advisability of giving to a particular organization, cannot
determine whether the money donated is utilized consistently with the donor's intent,
and cannot intelligently choose between the different parties competing for their
charitable dollars. 230
Second, the use of airwaves implicates the regulatory interests of the Federal
Communications Commission. The courts have permitted a greater degree of conflict
with traditional first amendment principles when the broadcast media are involved than
when any other form of communication is in issue, because the number of available
frequencies is limited and federally licensed broadcasters are "public trustees." 231
Third, the state has an interest in the deterrence and punishment of fraud.
Religion, like the secular world, has had its share of chicanery, often amounting to
considerable sums. Radio and television solicitations have triggered allegations of
fraud, 232 frequently suggesting that moneys collected in over-the-air appeals have
been diverted to purposes other than those for which they were publicly solicited.233
Television is not the only medium that has been abused by persons seeking religious
contributions. In 1978, the Roman Catholic Pallottine Order, using annual direct mail
fundraising techniques, spent less than four cents of each dollar it raised for the stated
solicitation purpose. 234
It is important to observe that fraud cannot be curbed simply by the use of criminal
prosecution. Indeed, even proponents of exempting religion from civil regulatory
requirements have acknowledged that insurmountable barriers often preclude sustain-
ing criminal fraud convictions against fundraisers for a religious belief.23 5 Reporting
and disclosure requirements, then, may represent the only ways to deal with the
fraud issue.
229. See Braiterman & Kelley, supra note 198, at 180-83.
230. See Rakay & Sugarman, A Reconsideration of the Religious Exemption: The Need for Financial Disclosure of
Religious Fund Raising and Solicitation Practices, 9 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 863, 890 (1978) (concluding that discretionary
disclosure by religious charities is insufficient protection for both the public and the beneficiaries of those charities). But
see Braiterman & Kelley, supra note 198, at 181-84 (arguing that although a religious group's voluntary disclosure to its
adherents may be appropriate, mandatory disclosure to government is never appropriate).
231. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969);
Brandywine-Main Line Radio v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973).
232. Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984); SEC v. World Radio
Mission, 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976); People v. Le Grande, 309 N.Y. 420, 131 N.E.2d 712 (1956); People v. Estep,
346 111. App. 132, 104 N.E.2d 562 (1952), writ dismissed, 413 11. 437, 109 N.E.2d 762 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
970 (1953); Albert, Federal Investigation of Video Evangelism: The FCC Probes the PTL Club, 33 OKLA. L. REv. 782
(1980).
233. Albert, supra note 232, at 783.
234. C. BAKAL, supra note 227, at 103-04. See also Rakay & Sugarman, supra note 202, at 864. The revelation
prompted calls for reporting requirements and internal reform within religious bodies. Id. at 864 n.7. Rakay and Sugarman
suggest a more circumscribed reporting requirement than we believe is required and suggest that the establishment clause
is applicable to their analysis. Rakay & Sugarman, supra note 230, at 886-89.
235. See Braiterman & Kelley, supra note 198, at 178-82; Esbeck, supra note 1, at 414-18; Comment, Diversion
of Church Funds to Personal Use: State, Federal and Private Sanctions, 73 J. CRa.,. L. & Crtn.ooGv 1204, 1207-20
(1982). See generally Heins, "Other People's Faiths": The Scientology Litigation and the Justiciability of Religious
Fraud, 9 HAsLnLes Cossr. L.Q. 153 (1981).
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The final noteworthy regulatory area raising church-state concerns involves the
political process. Institutional religion's role in politics is increasing. Religious
organizations have actively participated in political campaigns in efforts to help elect
church-supported candidates and to defeat office-holders who do not share the
churches' views. 236 Indeed, some analysts give religious activists credit for the
margin of victory in recent congressional elections.3 7 Activist religious organizations
also have succeeded in placing religiously motivated planks in party platforms and
religiously inspired referenda on the ballot.38
The financial involvement of religious institutions in the political process, made
possible at least to some extent by the sophisticated use of fundraising techniques
noted earlier, has increased as well. Religiously affiliated political action committees
contributed over eight million dollars to 1984 federal election campaigns.23 9 Some
church related political organizations boast impressive budgets. The Moral Majority
alone has a budget of approximately six million dollars a year.240 The Alliance for
Traditional Values, reportedly consisting of more than 100,000 member churches,
has a budget of approximately two and one-half million dollars. 241
This increased religious involvement in politics carries important implications.
First, it suggests that separation of church and state is for many a one-way street. As
Dean Kelley has explained, the current agenda of some religious groups is to
"amplify the symbolic evidences of religious allegiance in public life in order to
demonstrate the authority of God over the nation," while seeking to "press
back... government efforts to oversee, regulate and restrict the activities of
churches. ' 242 Second, some of the government's most important and direct interests
in reporting and disclosure inhere in the electoral and legislative processes. The
fairness and the voter awareness that these regulatory programs promote are essential
to the integrity of the electoral and legislative processes. 243 Excluding one segment
of participants by means of legislative exemption cuts at the very heart of the fairness
those laws were designed to achieve. 244 Again, the state's legitimate interest in
regulating religious institutions is indisputable.
236. Power, Glory--and Politics, Time, Feb. 17, 1986, at 62; D'Antonio, Onward, Christian Americans,
Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 15, 1985, at Cl, col. 3.
237. See D'Antonio, supra note 236, at Cl, col. 5.
238. Id.
239. Funsra. EuCnoNs COMMISSION, ComrmunoNs To 84 FortaL. CA AIGNS BY PACS-1983-84 CYCLE.
240. D'Antonio, supra note 236, at C6, col. 1.
241. Id.
242. Kelley, Introduction to Govwmnmrer IswrvEnoN iN Rsuoious An'us 9 (D. Kelley ed. 1982).
243. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-68
(1976).
244. By no means are religious organizations unanimous in the contention that they should be exempted from
regulation for their political activities. See, e.g., "Link of Religion, Politics Debated," Wash. Post, June 16, 1984, at
B6, col. 5-6 (reporting support by Lutheran Council spokesman for government regulation of church political activities).
Others have argued that church pronouncements (including lobbying) on political issues of the day enjoy free exercise
clause protection and should not be regulated. Caron & Dessingue, IRC 501(c)(3): Practical and Constitutional
Implications of "Political" Activity Restrictions, 2 J.L. & POL. 169, 181 (1985).
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B. The Inordinate Justifications Needed to Sustain a Government Regulation
Under the Regulatory Establishment Theory
Once the scope of activity of religious organizations in areas where the state has
a legitimate and substantial regulatory interest is recognized, the pragmatic impor-
tance of the regulatory establishment claim becomes more apparent. It casts doubt on
the validity of any state regulation, regardless of strong justifications for it, and turns
any regulatory contact initiated by government, no matter how routine or
unobtrusive, into a constitutional issue. Moreover, the recognition that church
organizations act as secular groups and, indeed, often compete with those groups,
leads inevitably to the conclusion that the regulatory establishment claim is
essentially a claim for favoritism. Both points merit separate discussion.
At least under current doctrine, the contention that application of the establish-
ment clause to regulatory issues would result in excessive protection for religious
institutions cannot be denied. The establishment clause represents one of the few
areas of constitutional litigation in which a challenged regulation cannot be upheld
even if supported by a compelling state interest. Once an enactment has been deemed
to violate any of the prongs of the Lemon test, the enactment is unconstitutional,
regardless of its justification. 245 Thus, under current doctrine, to conclude that a
government regulation implicates establishment clause concerns renders it per se
unconstitutional. 246
It might be argued that a compelling state interest component could be factored
into the establishment inquiry. 247 However, this would present problems with respect
to the continued validity of existing establishment jurisprudence. For example, little
doubt exists that some of the enactments that previously have been struck down under
the Lemon test would meet a compelling state interest requirement. A ready example
in this regard is the Title I program administered by the City of New York, which
provided assistance to low-income, educationally disadvantaged children. The
program was struck down this past term in Aguilar v. Felton.2 48 It is difficult to find
a more compelling state interest than that supporting this particular program;249 if a
compelling state interest test were adopted, it would suggest, at the least, that Aguilar
was wrong. But Aguilar does not stand alone.250 Most forms of parochial aid could
be supported under a compelling state interest formulation,2 1 given the Court's
245. See Laycoek, supra note 136, at 1386--87.
246. There is some suggestion in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) that a compelling state interest test
involves more rigorous review of a challenged enactment than does the Lemon test. In Larson, the Court invalidated a
statute that purportedly repressed a denominational preference. Holding that preferences cut at the heart of the
establishment clause, the Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis in which the statute would have to be narrowly
tailored to further the state's compelling interests. Id. at 247. The Court's apparent intention was to subject the statute to
the most exacting review because of purported harm to establishment values. The Court did not take into consideration,
however, that unlike the Lemon test, a strict scrutiny examination can be overcome by a showing of compelling
justification by the State. Cf. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
247. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 376-77; Note, Governmental Noninvolvement with Religious Institutions, 59 TEx. L.
REv. 921, 926, 943-45 (1981).
248. 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
249. See Laycock, supra note 136, at 1387-88.
250. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985).
251. Some, of course, might approve a doctrinal shift that would produce such a dramatic change in prior
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acknowledgment that the interest in providing educational aid to all its citizens
represents one of the state's highest priorities. 25 2
This precedential obstacle perhaps could be avoided by manipulating the
establishment inquiry further and applying a different standard to state action
involving aid than to that involving regulation. A compelling interest inquiry could
be limited solely to regulatory issues. The difficulty with this solution, however, is
that if establishment is held to apply to both regulatory and aid programs, then the
creation of an aid/regulation distinction has no justification-other than as a
mechanism to distinguish previous cases.
In any event, the problem of applying establishment analysis to government
regulatory programs runs far deeper than simply incompatibility with current
doctrine. Even if a compelling interest test, applicable solely to regulatory establish-
ment issues, could be worked into the jurisprudence, the effect on government
regulatory efforts would be stultifying.
Some commentators, for example, suggest that the state's interest would not meet
the compelling interest standard unless the religious organization's activity violates the
criminal law.25 3 This position, when examined in light of the regulatory establishment
claim that inquiry into the activities or beliefs of a religious organization violates
establishment principles, is even more absolutist than it initially appears, since it erects
a constitutional shield against the investigatory stages of a prosecution.2 54
Moreover, constitutional limits on the scope of inquiry into the validity of a
religious belief seriously reduces the possibility of successful prosecution even after
a criminal action has been maintained. A jury trying a case in which the defendant is
charged with fraudulently soliciting funds for faith healing, for example, may not
question the reasonableness or credulity of a religious claim but may only question
the defendant's sincerity. 255 Yet, as Justice Jackson has argued, how can a fact finder
intelligibly evaluate the sincerity of religious belief without, to some degree,
evaluating its believability?25 6 The conclusion is that many activities, including those
undeniably criminal, would escape prosecution if the regulatory establishment
position is accepted.25 7
decisions. The point here, however, is simply to emphasize the extent to which the regulatory establishment theory
represents a serious departure from precedent.
252. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
253. Braiterman & Kelley, supra note 198, at 172.
254. See, e.g., Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984) (rejecting
free exercise challenge to FCC investigation of fraudulent solicitation practices); SEC v. Knopfler, 658 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.
1981) (rejecting first amendment challenge to government subpoena issued in connection with investigation of possible
violations of federal securities laws); In re Rabbinical Seminary, 450 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (rejecting free
exercise challenge to government subpoena based on investigation of allegedly false statements made by church in
connection with federal aid programs); Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 479 N.E.2d 113 (1985) (holding that flrst
amendment does not bar judicial inquiry into church proceedings culminating in termination of minister, in order to
determine whether termination was based on violation of physician-patient confidentiality). See generally Comment,
supra note 235, at 1233-35.
255. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 84 (1944); Comment, supra note 235, at 1228-29; Heins, supra note
235, at 161-68.
256. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92-93 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
257. This has been acknowledged by advocates of constitutional protection. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 418-19;
Braiterman & Kelley, supra note 198, at 181. These authors assert, however, that any risks of fraud are necessary in
order to accommodate the constitutional interests.
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A more moderate position exists. It has been argued that protecting all activities
of religious institutions does not necessarily require absolute deference to them.
Authors have suggested that courts should adjust the degree of protection accorded to
religious institutions to reflect such variables as religious intensity, 258 whether the
regulated activity is internal or external, 25 9 the intensity and frequency of the
regulatory intrusion, 26° and the strength of the state's interest. 26' One difficulty with
this approach is that it is inconsistent with the premises allegedly supporting the claim
that all activities of religious organizations should be protected. For example, if the
process of theological development is to be protected, and that process occurs in any
church activity, how can some activities be held to be more protected than others?
Similarly, if the purpose of constitutional protection is to prevent structural
entanglement, can that goal be accomplished by adjusting scrutiny for levels of
interaction, when any state/church contact fully implicates this concern?
More importantly, however, as a vehicle for inhibiting government action, the
significance of characterizing any regulated activity as constitutionally protected
cannot be overstated. Even if degrees of protection are somehow incorporated into a
constitutional analysis, the existence of any first amendment interest demands
exacting scrutiny of the challenged regulation. 262 Thus, even the recordkeeping
requirements applied to businesses with a commercial purpose would require a
rigorous constitutional balancing if the business was owned by a religious organiza-
tion. 263 Moreover, the acceptance of a theory which posits that any contact creates a
constitutional issue makes available to religious institutions a defense that can be
raised at every stage of an enforcement proceeding-investigation, 264 adjudica-
tion, 265 and judgment.266 The drain on state resources in such circumstances may well
be insurmountable. Finally, a pragmatic view of constitutional adjudication demon-
strates that once the Court determines the existence of a protected constitutional right
it seldom, if ever, finds an overriding state interest. 267 In practical effect, then, if not
in theory, according all religious activities constitutional status would virtually
insulate them from the regulatory process. It would, in the words of one commentator
"place such organizations in an 'above-the-law' position." '26
258. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious
Organizations, 79 Coumi. L. REv. 1514 (1979); Laycock, supra note 136, at 1403, 1409-11.
259. Laycock, supra note 136, at 1403-09.
260. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 376-79; Serritella, supra note 12, at 157.
261. Serritella, supra note 12, at 159.
262. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); West Virginia State Bd. of Edue. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 639 (1943).
263. Compare Tony and Susan Alamo Found., 105 S. Ct. 1953, 1964 (1985) (dismissing claim that FLSA
recordkeeping requirements applied to commercial operations owned by religious foundation violated establishment
clause).
264. Claims that investigation violates the establishment clause have been raised in Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d
1263 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984), and in EEOC v. Pacific Press Pub. Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th
Cir. 1982).
265. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
266. Id.
267. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, .._.-...Nw. U.L. REv. - (1986) (forthcoming).
But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
268. See Note, The Forbidden Fruit of Church-State Contacts: The Role of Entanglement Theory in Its Ripening,
16 Su t= U.L. REv. 725, 750 (1982). But see Braiterman & Kelley, supra note 198, at 188.
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C. Favoritism
It is not only the public interest in government regulation that suffers harm by
the conclusion that religious organizations are entitled to constitutional protection for
all their activities. Secular segments of society also may be harmed. Whether a
religious organization invests in a business, seeks legislative action, or promotes the
candidacy of particular individuals for public office, it is engaging in an activity in
direct competition with secular individuals and organizations. To exempt religious
institutions from strictures governing these activities is to place those enterprises not
excluded at a competitive disadvantage. Further, this exclusion and relative benefit
expresses a policy of favoritism toward religious groups that may itself raise
constitutional concern.
The favoritism concern is most evident with respect to those regulations
affecting the political process, the media, or other channels for the dissemination of
ideas. On one level, to grant religious proponents unencumbered access to those
forums, while regulating their secular counterparts, creates a practical competitive
advantage to the religious proponents, since the religious organization need not
expend resources on regulatory compliance. Given two organizations with similar
budgets, one religious and one secular, the former would have more funds to expend
on the circulation of its views and the exertion of its influence-an extremely
significant advantage given the Supreme Court's adage that "money is speech." 269
The effect, then, is to bestow upon those seeking to advocate religious ideas more
power to do so. To equalize access to the marketplace of ideas, an advocate
expressing secular concerns would need to raise more money and seek more support
than would the religious proponent.
More troubling is that this specialized treatment for religious views confers upon
them not only a practical advantage, but also "a special status in the marketplace of
ideas.' '270 This favoritism towards religious ideas is not supported by the Constitu-
tion; in fact, it is contrary to the fundamental policies of the speech clause. As has
been explained, favoritism cuts at the very heart of the "equal liberty of expression
guaranteed by the first amendment,"271 by distorting the marketplace of ideas toward
the favored view. This undercuts the central notion that the first amendment assumes
every idea has equal dignity in the competition for acceptance and recognition. 272
269. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976). See Marshall, supra note 125, at 582 n.196; Polsby, Buckley v.
Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 Sup. Cr. Ray. 1 (1976); Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is
Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976).
270. Marshall, supra note 137, at 583.
271. Karst, Equality As a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. Ray. 20, 26 (1975). See Police
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1982); Consolidated Edison Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). See also Farber,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEo. L.J. 727 (1980); Redish, The Content
Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113 (1981); Stephan, The First Amendment and Content
Discrimination, 68 VA. L. Ray. 203 (1982); Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
Rv. 189 (1983); Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject Matter Restrictions,
46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81 (1978).
272. See Karst, supra note 271, at 23-26; Marshall, supra note 137, at 583. The free exercise clause does not
provide an exception to the fundamental tenet. The cases uniformly reject the proposition that free exercise entities
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Importantly, the free exercise clause does not disturb the rejection of favoritism
claims suggested by freedom of expression jurisprudence. Favoritism, whether or not
it affects speech concerns, also conflicts with the philosophy of establishment itself.
Freeing religious organizations from regulation provides a relative benefit for religion
over nonreligion, which may raise establishment concerns. 273 Relative benefit,
moreover, is not the only concern. As Judge J. Skelly Wright observed in addressing
a claim that religious broadcasters should be exempt from FCC antidiscrimination
provisions: "[S]ponsorship is what this exemption accomplishes. It is a sure formula
for concentrating and vastly extending the worldly influence of those religious sects
having the wealth and inclination to buy up pieces of the secular economy." 274
Finally, even the notion of voluntarism that has been presented as underlying the
regulatory establishment position does not support the favoritism claim. 275 As
Professor Giannella has explained, an important aspect of voluntarism is that different
ideologies compete for adherents based on their merit.276 Interpretations of the
religion clauses which tend to allow favoritism can find no comfort in the
constitutional proscription against establishment.
Indeed, the irony of the regulatory establishment position is that the favoritism
created by exempting religious institutions from laws affecting all others would
appear to raise the true establishment concern. After all, the policy against favoritism
towards religion is one of the values appropriately associated with the establishment
clause.27 7 While this does not mean that all legislatively created exemptions in favor
of religious organizations are unconstitutional, it does suggest that the argument that
the establishment clause requires favoritism turns establishment analysis on its head.
In response to this point, it has been argued that exempting religious organiza-
tions from regulation does not express favoritism but is simply a logical extension of
the rule that government may not aid religion. If the Constitution prohibits religious
organizations from receiving aid, it is argued, it also appropriately immunizes them
from government regulation. 278 This reciprocity contention has some intuitive appeal.
If support is precluded because the organization is "too religious," it might be "too
religious" to be regulated.
For several reasons, however, the apparent logic does not hold up to close
analysis. Even if the contention that the establishment clause requires symmetry were
religious speech to greater constitutional deference than secular speech. See Heffron v. ISKCON, 452 U.S. 640, 652-53
(1981); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164-65 (1944).
273. Miller, supra note 203, at 433. See King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 54 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 996 (1974). Barr v. United Methodist Church, 90 Cal. App. 3d 259, 274-75, 153 Cal. Rptr. 322, 333 (1979).
274. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974).
275. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 369.
276. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 81 HARV. L. Ryv. 513, 517
(196S).
277. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); P. KuR&No, REUGIoN A5ND Tim LAW oF CHURCH AND STATE AND
TE SLSEAE COuRT (1962).
278. Esbeck, supra note 1. Pickrell & Horwich, Religion As an Engine of Civil Policy: A Comment on the First
Amendment Limitation on the Church-State Partnerships in the Social Welfare Field, 44 LAw & Co,msw. PRoss. 111,
122-23 (1981).
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accepted, that clause does not create a strict no-aid rule. 279 In fact, court-approved
state benefits aiding the missions of churches have taken a variety of forms, including
some that have been held constitutionally required. The holding that states must
permit children to satisfy mandatory education laws by parochial schooling, for
example, confers an immeasurable benefit on the religious missions of churches. 280
Moreover, the financial aids to parochial schools that have been upheld in a number
of cases again suggest that the no-aid, no-regulation symmetry is not as absolute as
the reciprocity argument would maintain. 28' Indeed, if the reciprocity argument were
applied literally, it would suggest, in light of the property tax exemption upheld in
Walz v. Tax Commission,282 that religious institutions may be regulated pervasively
in their most religious sphere-the church itself. After all, the churches receive a
huge benefit-suggested to be worth four billion dollars per year-through property
tax exemptions. 283
In any event, the premise of the reciprocity argument is flawed. There is no clear
reason why there should be a reciprocal balance contained within the establishment
clause. If anything, the far more likely candidate from which to correlate reciprocal
burdens and benefits is the free exercise clause, since that clause has traditionally
been used to impose burdens, while the establishment clause has placed limits only
upon the benefits a government may confer on religious organizations. 28 4 Finally, a
pure application of some symmetry notion can hardly be what advocates of church
autonomy would seek. A logical extension of removing all government influence on
religion may be the removal of all church influence over government. The
establishment position, if accepted, may ultimately limit constitutional protection
accorded religious institutions by demanding that they be prohibited from, or at least
limited in, their political activity. 285
IV. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS-THE APPROPRIATE
CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY
The conclusion is that protection for religious institutions from government
regulation is not found within the establishment clause. Rather, any limits must be
found in other constitutional provisions. Essentially, this position does not differ
materially from the status quo. The confusion and doctrinal imprecision in this area,
however, requires brief discussion of two further issues. First, since the proliferation
of the establishment argument, particularly in its entanglement form, has infiltrated
free exercise analysis, the independence of free exercise from those concerns must be
279. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646 (1979).
280. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Marshall, supra note 267, at .......... (forthcoming).
281. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 106 S. Ct. 748 (1986); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1979); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968).
282. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
283. LAsox & LowasL, TiH Rsuexous E, ,rs 18 (1976).
284. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
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reiterated. Second, the role of establishment in regulatory cases, in contexts other
than as a vehicle to require blanket exemptions, must be determined. We now turn
briefly to these issues.
A. The Role of Free Exercise
The limits imposed on government regulation by the free exercise clause are
more easily described than applied. Relative to the protections available through the
application of an establishment theory, however, they clearly are more circum-
scribed. Protection for religious activity exists only if it can be shown that the
regulation interferes with the practice of religious activities or violates matters of
conscience. 8 6 This definition will not implicate many activities of religious institu-
tions which are appropriate subjects of regulatory effort. 287
The recognition of the relatively limited scope of constitutional protection
available to religious organizations should have significant effect on future litigation.
Most important would be the realization that no abstract constitutional interest in
nonentanglement exists. This means, for example, that regulatory requirements
should not be found unconstitutional because they might require the government or
a court to determine whether the regulated activity is undertaken pursuant to religious
calling. Governmental inquiry of this type is not unconstitutional entanglement; it is
a necessary by-product of the desire to defer to religious-based decisions of the
regulated organization.28 8 Equally inappropriate are claims that regulatory require-
ments are unconstitutional because they hold religious institutions accountable or
increase the contacts between church and state. There is no right, whether it be
characterized as nonentanglement or otherwise, to be free from any and all
government restriction. 28 9
Determining which government regulations will survive the appropriate free
exercise standard is not susceptible to defimitive resolution, since traditional free
exercise analysis is often fact-specific. 290 Nonetheless, some general observations are
in order. First, government regulations such as employment discrimination or labor
practice restrictions are not unconstituional simply because they subject religious
institutions to agency jurisdiction. A constitutional issue exists only if an order of the
regulatory agency violates religious exercise-as might occur by regulating employ-
ment decisions regarding ministers and clergy, whose positions are "inextricably
286. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
287. An expanded protection from state regulation for religious institutions, equivalent to that inherent in any
establishment theory of constitutional protection could, of course, be accomplished through an expansion of the
understanding of the role of free exercise. This is the position of Professor Laycock who, while rejecting a general right
of religious institutions to be free from government regulation as a nonestablishment principle, argues that such a right
is available to religious groups under a principle of church autonomy, which he finds embodied in the free exercise clause.
See Laycock, supra note 116. Laycock's reasons for seeking an expansion of the rights of religious organizations beyond
the limits currently recognized in free exercise analysis (other than his suggestion that the principle he advocates is
grounded in constitutional text and Court doctrine) are substantially in accord with those supporting the establishment
claim and have previously been addressed throughout this Article.
288. See supra notes 269-272 and accompanying text.
289. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 106 S.Ct. 2718 (1986).
290. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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woven with worship and the practice of religion.''291 Recordkeeping and reporting
requirements should also survive free exercise scrutiny, and therefore religion clause
scrutiny, in most instances, since these restrictions would not likely interfere with
religious tenets or practices.2 92
This does not mean that, in the absence of a free exercise claim, religious
institutions will have no protection from government regulations. Solicitations, for
example, are strongly protected by the speech clause.2 93 Similarly, the right of
association may protect a religious organization from complying with reporting
requirements, if it can show that disclosure will create a risk that persons identified
may be harassed, or that others may be inhibited from joining or contributing to the
organizations.2 94 Importantly, however, any protection extended under speech or
association would not protect solely religious entities, as would a constitutional
protection based upon principles of establishment or free exercise. 295
Expanded protection for religious organizations may also be found under another
associational theory as well-one which Esbeck terms "socio-political. ' 2 96 The
socio-political theory posits that certain social sub-groups should be protected as
organizations, since the existence of these "intermediate communities" preserves
individual freedom by shielding individuals from the power of the state. 297 This
argument has much force and, in other contexts, the Supreme Court has been quite
sensitive to the need to defend groups and associations as means of promoting
individual freedom.2 98 Indeed, the case for the creation of constitutional protection
for groups has received particularly powerful support from the writings of the
commentators as well. 299 Again, however, the socio-political theory does not
separate religious from nonreligious groups. As Esbeck acknowledges, secular
groups, such as those based on ethnic or political alliances, are also intermediate
communities, and accordingly should be protected under socio-political theory. 300
The socio-political theory, then, is a principle that supports increased protection for
religious and nonreligious institutions both under the religion clauses.
291. See Bagni, supra note 195, at 1544.
292. It has been argued, however, that reporting may offend certain religious tenets. See Petition for Certiorari, Faith
Center, Inc. v. FCC, petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1985) (No. 85-527), cert. denied, 106
S.Ct. 527 (1985), reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 900 (1986).
293. Secretary of State of Md. v. J.M. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Schaunburg v. Citizens For a Better
Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
294. See Brown v. Socialist Workers, 459 U.S. 87 (1982); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
295. Esbeck raises fear of threat from government as an argument in favor of protecting religious organizations
under a regulatory establishment theory. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 374. He does not raise the possibility that a right of
association would serve equally to protect religious organizations in this circumstance.
296. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 369-70.
297. L. TiDsE, Ameu.cA CoNs'TrmmoNAL Aw 974 (1978); R. NIsBEr, TuE Qutr OR Co.wuNrry (1968); Garet,
Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 USC L. Rsv. 1001, 1035 (1983); Linder, Freedom of Associatlion
After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 McH. L. Rav. 1878, 1881 (1985).
298. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 465 U.S. 1077 (1984).
299. See Garet, supra note 297.
300. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 369-70.
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B. The Limited Role of Establishment
1. Exemptions for Religious Institutions
A highly troublesome question is whether exemptions from regulatory programs
themselves violate the establishment clause. The Court has yet to invalidate a blanket
regulatory exemption for all religious organizations as an improper establishment.301
In Walz v. Tax Commission,30 2 for example, the Court upheld the property tax
exemptions for religious institutions. More significantly, in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago,30 3 and Larson v. Valente,30 4 the Court construed challenged statutes to
create exemptions for religious institutions from government regulation.
The limited trend, evident in these cases, toward approval of exemptions
represents sound policy. Exemptions from regulatory programs, since they do not
involve affirmative aids or subsidies, generally do not connote endorsement. This is
particularly true when legitimate policy considerations justify a legislative decision to
remove religious institutions from regulatory purview.3 05 Laycock is assuredly
correct, in at least some circumstances, in his assertion that "the state does not
support or establish religion by leaving it alone." 306
Nonetheless, it is equally clear, as our previous discussion of favoritism
indicates, that in some circumstances exemptions can raise establishment concerns,
especially with respect to those regulations affecting the political process, the media,
and other avenues for the dissemination of ideas. In those areas, leaving religion
alone inappropriately confers a special benefited status upon religion in the
"marketplace of ideas"-a status that offends both establishment and freedom of
expression interests.3 07
Exemptions may raise establishment concerns in other regulatory areas as well.
Exemptions of religiously owned enterprises from business or employment regula-
tions may provide religious groups with competitive advantages that may harm their
secular competitors. Perhaps this problem may be best addressed by equal protection
analysis, as one court has suggested, 308 but to the extent that exemptions augment the
ability of religious organizations to exert influence in the secular world, they raise
establishment concerns beyond simple competitive advantage. Judge Wright's
observation that exemptions may be a sure formula for concentrating and extending
the worldly influence of religious sects, indicates establishment issues may arise even
in commercial contexts. 3°9 The difficulty arises with determining whether the
exemption is an appropriate accommodation of church and state or is instead an
301. In Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 288 (1982), the Court struck down a provision which exempted some, but not
all, religious organizations.
302. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
303. 440 U.S. 490 (1970).
304. 456 U.S. 288 (1982).
305. Marshall, supra note 137, at 546.
306. Laycock, supra note 136, at 1416.
307. See supra notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
308. Milwaukee Montessori School v. Percy, 473 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
309. See supra note 274 and accompanying text quoting King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See also Miller, supra note 203.
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unconstitutional "formula" of the type noted in Judge Wright's opinion. For our
purposes it is sufficient to conclude that exemptions may raise establishment
problems but do not do so in every circumstance. Some accommodation is
permissible.
2. Preferential Treatment
A less troublesome issue is whether regulatory programs which exempt some,
but not all, religious organizations raise establishment concerns. Some direction on
this issue has been provided by the Supreme Court. In Larson v. Valente310 the Court,
relying on the establishment clause, struck down a Minnesota regulation governing
charitable fundraising by religious institutions on the grounds that it exempted some,
but not all, religions. 31 1 Applying a strict scrutiny analysis, the Court found that the
line the state drew between exempted and non exempted religions was not
appropriately tailored to meet the state's interest and could be viewed only as
preferring religions which the state exempted over those the state did not exempt.312
As such, it violated the proscription of preferential treatment mandated by the
establishment clause and was therefore constitutionally infirm. 313
Professor Laycock argues that the establishment clause is not the proper vehicle
to review regulations that have disparate effects on religious organizations. Rather, he
suggests free exercise or equal protection as more appropriate standards of review. 314
We disagree. First, free exercise analysis would not reach many disparate treatment
cases. As we have seen, free exercise requires a showing that the challenged
regulation affects the exercise of religion. In Larson, for example, this would mean
that the regulated organization would have to establish that the reporting and record
keeping requirements imposed by the Minnesota statute infringed upon its religious
exercise, a showing that would be at best difficult to make. Laycock himself avoids
this problem by holding any activity undertaken by religious organizations to be
protected by free exercise. But if his premise as to the scope of free exercise is
rejected, as we suggest, then the conclusions as to its role in disparate treatment cases
must fall as well.
There is a stronger case for utilizing equal protection analysis to invalidate
governmental regulations which discriminate between religions, and it is likely that
if that provision were made the governing inquiry, little or no difference in case
results would occur. Not surprisingly, however, the equal protection clause has never
been utilized by the Court in disparate treatment cases; indeed, the closest it has come
to this approach is a casual remark in New Orleans v. Dukes315 that religion is a
suspect class entitled to strict scrutiny in equal protection analysis. 3 16 However, our
310. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
311. Id. at 246.
312. Id. at 246-51.
313. Id. at 255.
314. Laycock, supra note 136, at 1382.
315. 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
316. Id. at 303.
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rejection of equal protection as the governing inquiry has less to do with the meaning
of equal protection than it does with the central meaning of establishment. One of the
least disputed purposes of the establishment clause is to proscribe denominational
preferences. As the Court appropriately declared in Larson, "The clearest command
of the Establishment Clause is that one denomination cannot be officially preferred
over another. ' 317 To the extent that the government enacts a preference in any form,
be it in affirmative support or by a regulatory exclusion, it violates this essential
establishment tenet.3t 8 It is therefore appropriate that these cases be decided under
establishment principles.
Indeed, this conclusion is in a large sense a reflection of the central position of
this Article. The constitutional meaning of establishment is consistent with what the
word itself connotes-benefit, endorsement, and aid. To regulate is not to establish.
317. 456 U.S. 288, 244 (1982).
318. For an instance when an arguable discrimination between religious beliefs was held to be constitutionally
pernissible, see Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (provision upheld which allowed conscientious objector
status to dissidents who opposed all wars, not solely unjust wars).
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